


JPRS-EER-82-061  
16 MAY 1982



**JPRS**  
Joint  
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# **JPRS Report—**

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-061

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16 May 1992

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**Possible Effects of Withdrawal From Ukraine  
Plant**

LD1105204592 Prague CSTK in English 1127 GMT  
11 May 92

[Text] Bratislava May 11 (CSTK)—The Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA today likened the Czechoslovak Government's decision of April 16 to stop work at the construction of an ore dressing plant in Ukraine to Czechoslovakia's dispute with Hungary over a joint twin-dam system on the Danube.

"The only difference is that now it is us who are in the role of Hungary," the paper says. (Hungary stopped work on its part of the project in 1989 and last week decided it would abrogate the agreement.)

The paper refers to the plant at Kryvoy Rog, into which Czechoslovakia has so far invested 10,000 million crowns (about \$340 million). It writes that the current talks in Ukraine on the level of government communists are very complicated as the 1988 bilateral agreement with the former Soviet Union cannot be abrogated.

The paper also quotes an unidentified official in the Czechoslovak Economics Ministry as saying that it is not clear with whom the talks will be conducted in the future as the commitments of the former USSR are taken over by Russia, but that the plant is in Ukraine.

The East Slovak Iron Works (VSZ) in Kosice, which is to be the largest buyer of the ore from Kryvoy Rog, has said that if Czechoslovakia stops work on the project and unilaterally withdraws from it, relations with Ukraine can be expected to be seriously aggravated. The amount of demanded compensation by Ukraine can now be hardly predicted and retaliatory measures in the form of halting ore supplies to Czechoslovakia cannot be ruled out, the paper quotes VSZ Kosice as saying.

Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the project will affect Slovakia, which is likely to lose about 600 jobs for people who would work at Kryvoy Rog for ten years. Dušan Kandler, director of the strategic department at VSZ Kosice, told the paper.

**Alleged Intentions in Gabčíkovo Interpreted**

92C90526-4 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 May 92  
p 1

Interview with Zoltan Valencovic, chairman of the Department of International Law and Policy, Comenius University in Bratislava, by Milan Ruskov, place and date not given. "The Boundary Is a Matter of Concern—Legal Aspects of Danube Waterworks."

[Text] In recent days it was reported that the Hungarian parliament had authorized the government to rescind the Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement on the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros waterworks system if the CSFR does not stop by 30 April 1992 operations

connected with the initial technical plan. This allegedly expressed standpoint put finally an end to the efforts of the Hungarian government over several months to change the Czechoslovak position. We interviewed the chairman of the Department of International Law and Policy at the Comenius University's Department of Law in Bratislava, lecturer Dr. [Zoltan Valencovic].

[Ruskov] What do you think about this new situation?

[Valencovic] I welcomed the statement from the Hungarian side because at long last, after almost three years of controversies about the waterworks and in particular about the 1977 agreement, Budapest clearly defined its position as we had anticipated from the beginning, since 1989 when it first started to make obstructions. With this decision it confirmed that above all, it always intended to abrogate the agreement of 1977.

[Ruskov] But always using ecological arguments.

[Valencovic] Despite many appeals by the CSFR, despite our willingness and readiness to let an independent international commission assess the ecological impact of the waterworks on natural conditions, to this day the Hungarian partner has not shown any interest in such cooperation. However then all of a sudden it declared its compliance and what is more presented it as its own initiative, only to renege after a few weeks. By having authorized the government to repeal the agreement unilaterally, the Hungarian parliament in fact confirmed that this was its objective of long standing. Actually it is not so much concerned about any ecological problems as with other political and power issues.

[Ruskov] What specifically do you mean by that?

[Valencovic] If we consider the well-known statements by top Hungarian constitutional and governmental officials, it becomes evident that certain forces in the Hungarian political center are striving to restore the Great Hungary and it is obvious that the 1977 agreement stands in the way of their ambitions. However those are already issues of international politics which should be of interest to the European Community as a whole, because the current policies on the Hungarian side justify fears that they are intended to prepare the ground for a revision of the existing system of borders as stipulated by the 1947 Paris peace treaties. It seems that in this case Budapest attaches little importance to the conclusions of the Helsinki Conference and its Final Act. Europe should realize that because it completely changes correlations of problems stemming from the 1977 agreement.

[Ruskov] Let us assume that the Hungarian side revokes that agreement. In terms of international law, what consequences would ensue?

[Valencovic] Basically, this is a dispute between states. In essence, one of the parties to the agreement refuses to fulfill the obligations it has adopted. Because so far

Hungary itself has not questioned the validity of the 1977 agreement; its failure to meet its obligations means a serious violation of international law. In terms of international law, that constitutes a responsibility with all its consequences for the Hungarian party, while it enables the Czechoslovak party to take whatever measure may be necessary to fulfill the objective of the agreement, including enforcement of the right to demand compensation for potential damages which the non-fulfillment of contractual obligations by the Hungarian partner might cause the CSFR.

[Rusko] What about the Hungarian change that we intend to *violate* the agreement?

[Valentová] Such changes have no basis in international law. According to the norms in force at the time, states may take steps to improve conditions for navigation on the Danube. I should like to point out the Treaty of Trianon as well as pacts concluded in Paris in 1947 and in Belgrade in 1948. From that it follows that the CSFR has not violated any norm of international law. On the contrary, its actions in conjunction with Variation C conform with international law. If we implement Variation C on our territory and thus at our sovereignty we do not encroach on the border stipulated by the agreement of 1977. The Czechoslovak side is prepared to meet its obligations in their full extent. Also, although our approach to the fulfillment of that agreement is in agreement with the international law in force, the same cannot be said about the approach by the other side. For instance, I can find no explanation for the statement made by G. Tatar, representative of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, at a press conference last Friday, in the sense that the Hungarian side would not accept any potential violation of the territorial integrity of the Hungarian Republic nor any substantive changes in the character of the border between both republics.

After all, there is no such danger! Irrespective of any change of the navigation route, the borderline will follow the old Danube river bed in conformance with the treaty concluded in 1977. At this moment I cannot predict the reaction of our official foreign policy to the latest development and to the Hungarian attitude. In my opinion, however, it should advance to a constructive offensive because the right and truth are on our side.

#### **Another Option for Danube Dam Suggested**

92CB0504B Prague DOKUMENT HCN PREHLED  
in Czech 17 Mar 92 pp H/11/12

[Unattributed report "Variations for Completing Construction of the System of Water Management Projects on the Danube River"]

[Text] In solving the completion of construction involving the system of water management projects on the Danube River known as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project six variations were considered in 1991. On 21 May 1991 the government of the Slovak Republic approved Variation C. On 22 January 1991 J.

Vavroušek, minister-chairman of the Federal Committee for the Environment, presented a new variation which modifies Variation D in view of the status of work at the Hrušov impoundment.

Variation A—completing the system of water management projects at Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros in accordance with the interstate agreement of 1977.

The Gabčíkovo water management project, with the following principal facilities—the Hrušov-Dunakalmi impoundment with a volume of 200 million cubic meters of water, the Dunakalmi weir with its auxiliary lock chamber and intake conduit which is 1.7 km long, the Gabčíkovo stage with the hydroelectric power plant (installed capacity 720 MW) and lock chambers, and an 8.2-km-long drainage conduit.

The Nagymaros water management project, with the following principal facilities—protective facilities on Czechoslovak territory, the Nagymaros stage with the hydroelectric power plant (installed capacity 158 MW) and lock chambers, dredging of the Danube River bed beneath the Nagymaros stage.

Variation B—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project in accordance with the 1977 interstate agreement, without the concurrent completion of the Nagymaros water management project. Integration of operations in the flow-through mode.

Variation C—building the Gabčíkovo water management project only on Czechoslovak territory with a smaller impoundment facility without the Nagymaros water management project.

Variation D (1991)—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project without the Hrušov impoundment and without completing the Nagymaros water management project.

Variation D (1992)—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project without completing the Nagymaros water management project. Return the Danube River bed to its original state in that portion of the Hrušov impoundment which has already been constructed; build an electric power plant in the area of the Hrušov dam, which would be used to return 400 to 1,350 cubic meters of water to the original Danube River bed (in place of the original 50 cubic meters). The intake and outflow conduits and the other facilities of the hydroelectric power plant at Gabčíkovo would be retained and would be utilized in accordance with the original proposals without additional construction modification.

Variation E—utilizing the Gabčíkovo water management project for navigation purposes, for flood control and utilizing it, in part, for purposes of energy production.

Variation F—halting all work on the system of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water management projects and modifying existing construction.

Variation C—utilizing some of the facilities particularly the dams, in support of flood protection, gradually dismantling the other facilities of the Gabčíkovo water management project and reclaiming the countryside.

#### Journalists Query Politicians on Constitution

621 00488-1 Prague TELEGRAPH in Czech 1 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by JVA: "Statism Versus Liberalism"]

[Text] Last Wednesday evening there were discussions for journalists with representatives of the leadership of the CNR [Czech National Council] and the SNR [Slovak National Council] held at the Brno Press Club. The subject of the evening was an evaluation of the process of determining the legal basis for the state in the CSFR. Vice-chairmen Jan Vlach (ODS [Civic Democratic Party]) and Ján Kalvoda (ODA [Civic Democracy Alliance]) participated on the Czech side and Ján Kiepac (SKDH [Slovak Christian Democratic Movement]) and Milan Žemáš (independent) were there for Slovakia.

Ján Kiepac (SKDH) stated that there were places in the Milový treaty where it should have spoken to the question of who is a participant in the treaty to replace the long-winded formulations about people. The text in this form is not a treaty between the republics but a legislative initiative of the national councils. The Milový document, in his opinion, does not mean a shift in Czechoslovak relations and in many areas it is less than the current constitutional relationship.

Ján Kalvoda (ODA) replied in response to this that the text from Milový was not actually a proposal for a treaty between republics. A treaty between republics would in fact have meant ignoring the constitution at the price of an agreement. According to J. Kalvoda, however, that is the path which the developments in Yugoslavia have taken.

In his view the group of politicians participating in the negotiations about the state legal arrangement has not succeeded and will bear the responsibility for their actions before the voters in the elections.

The conflicts arise from the fact that the Slovak political scene is tending toward the left, toward maximizing the role of the state, which will also become the guarantor of national development. However, the state cannot be such a guarantor. The Czech political scene is leaning toward the right and therefore a conflict arises between the Slovak idea of a state which manages everything, that is, statism, and the Czech concept of the free citizen, that is, liberalism. J. Kalvoda feels that the developments are leading toward an independent Slovakia.

After that, he stated that it is necessary either to accept a joint state with all the limitations resulting from it or it is better to split up into two independent entities. J. Kiepac questioned whether it was necessary to accept even such limitations as, for example, the PS [Federal

Assembly], abolishing majority rule. J. Kalvoda responded affirmatively to which M. Žemáš said: "Then the matter is clear."

On the question of privatization, J. Kalvoda stated that the Czech government displayed questionable responsibility when it did not accept the different processes of privatization in the Czech lands and Slovakia. That proposal was submitted to minister T. Jarko. In his words, any eventual separation would take place in a reasonable manner. The expenses for separation would correspond to the method in which it was carried out.

Milan Žemáš (independent) stated that the Slovak citizens have other interests than do the Czechs. J. Kalvoda added to this that as far as the Slovak population thinks that it needs more support from the state, more control and less independence than the Czechs, then it will be necessary to divide the state.

According to Ján Vlach (ODS) it is not possible to preserve the joint state if the unified economic area or the unified banking system is not preserved. Moreover the SKDH is talking about the fact that it is necessary to declare an independent Slovakia. J. Kiepac commented on this that the SKDH is really after an independent Slovakia.

On the question of a federal arrangement, J. Vlach expressed himself to say that a multi-member federation is a more stable unit. According to M. Žemáš, however, this is unacceptable for the Slovak side because the CSFR is made up of two peoples.

J. Vlach stated that one cannot imagine postsecession cooperation of the ODS with the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia). The ideas of the HZDS on economic reform are unacceptable for the ODS, particularly some of the socialist views on the third path held by some HZDS economists.

#### Preelection Change in SNR Presidium Viewed

421 00488-1B Bratislava NOV 3 1991 08  
J Slov 11 Apr 92 p 1

[Commentary by Jánoska-Burk-Huska-Selection]

[Text] Because of its large membership and vigorous political activity the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) exerts more and more influence on our preelection political scene. It may seem that the nationally oriented political subjects within it have been overshadowed. However, the meetings of prominent HZDS leaders with citizens have confirmed that the HZDS also increasingly inclines towards a nationalistic orientation. According to statements made in recent days particularly by A. M. Huska, Milan Knásek, Rudolf Fíkáček as well as Roman Kováč, the HZDS will not join any preselection coalition with nationally oriented parties but will continue to promote the formation of a nationalistic bloc in the Slovak parliament. It should consist, in addition to the HZDS, of the SKDH [Slovak Christian Democratic

Movement), the SNS (Slovak National Party); and the SNDH (Slovak National Democratic Movement).

The HZDS's deputy chairman and deputy of the Slovak National Council (SNR) A.M. Huska in particular made an unusually straightforward and courageous pronouncement at the last meeting of the movement's leaders with Bratislava's citizens, stating verbatim: "The HZDS, SNS, and SKDH are enough for Slovakia in her national interest; even after the elections the Slovak Republic will not need any additional political parties. Those three parties are absolutely sufficient to enforce Slovakia's national interests."

The leaders of the HZDS are unusually unanimous as concerns the issue of cooperation with clearly nationally oriented political entities. In fact, at this time the Slovak National Party is the closest to the HZDS with which it advocates certain joint actions in the Slovak parliament. One of them will be their proposal for a revamping of the Presidium of the SNR even before the coming elections. A.M. Huska, M. Knaacko and R. Filian explained their latest political initiative as follows: "The Slovak parliament will soon cease its operation, but the work of the SNR Presidium will continue practically unrestricted until the first day of the elections. By the same token, this particular institution has the authority not only to adopt but also to reject many legal measures. For Slovakia the current 'homemakatura' composition of the SNR Presidium is extremely unfavorable and in its executive steps very harmful." Nevertheless, the HZDS leaders maintain that a substantive change in this respect may take place at any time because of the already-existing relations of nationally oriented parties with the HZDS.

#### Duray Interviewed on Minority Rights

41-18615492 Prague RL DE PR 611  
16 Czech 1 May 92 p 11

[Interview with Együttettség-Coexistence Chairman Miklós Duray by Ján Zuzka place and date not given. "We Are in Favor of Territorial and Cultural Autonomy"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak political movement, Együttettség-Coexistence-Szövetség, is the largest organization of ethnic minorities in the CSFR. Együttettség Chairman Miklós Duray responded to questions regarding the movement's objections to the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty and the movement's objectives with regard to ethnic issues and the status of ethnic minorities within the CSFR.

[Zuzka] You have said recently that the signed Czechoslovak-Polish treaty—and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty that is under preparation—do not anchor the rights of ethnic minorities. What did you mean by that?

[Duray] I had mainly in mind the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty, which does not pay attention to the protection of interests of minorities provided by their mother nations.

The treaty does not deal with the obligations of the mother nation toward its minorities abroad. This applies to Czechs and Slovaks living on Polish territory and to Poles living in the CSFR. We do not want this obligation to be understood as activity aimed against the majority nation of the country in which the minorities reside. Moreover, we see a flaw in the fact that the treaty does not provide for sufficient incentives for bilateral cooperation in the border regions and that it does not outline solutions to environmental problems in Upper Silesia. In recent decades, urbanization destroyed the structure of settlement of the Polish minority there. International documents, however, provide for the principle of the protection of ethnic structures in the regions inhabited by minorities. In the Silesian regions, no sufficient preconditions have been created for that. As far as the education system is concerned, additional objections have been raised regarding mutual assistance with the completion of the education systems for minorities in both countries. We did not want the treaty to be changed, since it had been initiated already. Yet, in the spirit of this treaty that provides for the possibility of concluding additional sub-treaties and supplements, we pushed for an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments on the protection of or assistance to minorities.

[Zuzka] Does this also apply to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty that is under preparation?

[Duray] No, we have not spoken about it. However, it is a well-known fact that the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty is also the basis for the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty. We do not want the said flaws and weaknesses to reappear in this treaty, too.

[Zuzka] How would you describe the main goals of your movement regarding the ethnic policy?

[Duray] Above all, we are concerned with the fact that the minorities rights should be guaranteed by law. The constitution—or a constitutional law—is not enough. The rights must be spelled out in a more specific way. Apart from this, we want certain autonomy to be respected in the sphere of education and culture. Rights and claims of the minorities should be respected according to the needs of minorities, irrespective of whether someone permits it or not. It is a certain type of paternalism if someone decides whether minorities' rights are justified or not.

[Zuzka] What about administrative and territorial autonomy?

[Duray] It is necessary to distinguish according to the principle of adequate enforcement of the rights and grant rights to citizens, or groups of citizens in the country [as published]. However, we should speak about self-administration rather than about autonomy. Autonomy is quite a general word. Local self-administration is a certain form of autonomy. Autonomy is a generally declared identity, while the self-administration is a specific form thereof. Cultural self-administration can be

applied to minorities who live as a compact group and scattered minorities. Territorial self-administration can be applied to compact groups of minorities.

[Zurka] Territorial self-administration would be adequate for the Hungarian minority, then. Is that your movement's official demand?

[Duray] Yes. However, we have never said that we demand self-administration for the Hungarian minority. We are in favor of solving problems of minorities by establishing cultural or territorial self-administration, which would be based, if possible, on [smaller units of] local self-administrations. We are not speaking exclusively about the Hungarian minority but about other minorities, too. Our movement does not represent only the Hungarian minority.

[Zurka] What is your specific idea about self-administration? Does it provide for the existence of elected bodies for the entire region?

[Duray] Self-administration should be built from below—that is, on the basis of municipal and local self-administration—in the form of regional groupings—and should be based on their own decision. Territorial self-administration can be established only on the principle of regionalism.

[Zurka] Do you prefer the word "self-administration" to the word "autonomy" because autonomy is perceived as having a more radical meaning than self-administration?

[Duray] We are not using the word because it is more convenient to us, but because it says better what we want to achieve.

[Zurka] As a dissident, you spoke strongly against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's ethnic policy. Do you think that the situation has changed now and that the ethnic problems are being solved?

[Duray] Something has changed. Minorities can express their opinions within the framework of their political organizations and on various occasions. An improvement in the solution to the problems of minorities has not been achieved, however. The constitutional law of 1988 on minorities' rights has been abolished, and the Constitutional Charter on Basic Human Rights and Freedoms has not fully replaced it, because it devotes less space to the rights of minorities. In this sense, it was a step backward.

[Zurka] You have spoken about the education system. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia has its own education system, its own schools. Is that status?

[Duray] It is true that it has its own schools, but we must say that its full needs are not met. In the past 40 years, more than 60 percent of Hungarian schools disappeared, or were abolished, as the case may be. There is no possibility of their revival. The system of elementary and high schools is not sufficient, and neither is the teachers' training. By the end of the decade, there will be a

shortage of more than 2,000 teachers in Hungarian schools. This means further disappearance of schools and the drop in their level.

[Zurka] How would your movement react to a possible disintegration of Czechoslovakia?

[Duray] We are an all-Czechoslovak movement. A disintegration of the CSFR would definitely weaken our movement and diminish its international character. We have shown several times that we consider the preservation of the constituency of Czechoslovakia as an element of stability in Europe. Despite the political situation in Slovakia, we have arrived at the opinion that Czechoslovakia will probably not disintegrate—if something unexpected does not happen, or if the present policy does not change radically.

[Zurka] Would separation trends arise among the citizens of Hungarian nationality?

[Duray] I cannot answer that because it will become clear only after the disintegration takes place—if it does. For the time being, there are not even signs of separation. It is difficult to foresee the reaction of the people.

[Zurka] A large part of your movement involves the Hungarian minority, which is the largest in the CSFR. What are your relations with other Hungarian parties and movements in Czechoslovakia? Do you believe that you will remain the most influential organization protecting the interests of this minority?

[Duray] For the time being, we are really the largest organization of this type. Based on the results of local elections, we can say that our movement has the support of 65 percent of Hungarian voters. Relations with other parties and movements are balanced. Relations with the Hungarian Civic Democratic party are not the best. This is probably mostly because they are members of the government coalition and we are not. Well, we have general disagreements, as is usual between government parties and opposition parties.

[Zurka] The Polish paper GAZETA WYBORCZA wrote that you are an organization representing mostly Hungarians and that other minorities are only a veil disguising the Hungarian character of your movement.

[Duray] It is not our fault that the Hungarian minority is the largest one. Even if all the Poles, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Germans backed our movement, we would still be the majority.

#### 'Test' of Bill on Publication of StB Files

AK 1005/74492 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech 6 May 92 p. 3

[<sup>1</sup>"Draft Law on Publishing a List of Citizens Registered in the Files of the State Security Corps," approved at an extraordinary meeting of the Czech Government on the night of 4 May]

[Text] At an extraordinary meeting on the night of 4 May, the Czech Government approved a draft law on publishing a list of some citizens registered in the files of the now defunct State Security Corps [StB]. We publish the full text of this draft law, which has been submitted to the Czech National Council.

The CSFR Federal Assembly has passed the following law:

#### **Presentable**

The purpose of this law is to contribute to knowledge about our past, to eliminate the influence of former StB structures, and to prevent the spreading of misinformation about the cooperation of some citizens with the former StB.

#### **Article 1**

This law lays down the conditions for and the method of publishing the names of citizens entered in the register of files of the former StB from 25 February 1948 to 17 November 1989 as StB resident agents, agents, holder of a leased or compensation apartment, informer, or ideological collaborator (Footnote 1), their StB steering officers, and some employees of the Federal Ministry of Interior (hereafter referred to only as "list").

#### **Article 2**

(1) The list will be compiled by the Federal Ministry of Interior (hereafter referred to only as "ministry") in alphabetical order. The list will include the name, surname, date and place of birth, and code name of individual citizens registered in the files and of their steering officers. Regarding individual citizens, the list will include the period during which they were registered as persons performing activities listed in Article 1 and regarding steering officers the period of their contract of employment.

(2) Furthermore, the ministry will include in the list, commensurately with all data according to Article 1, employees of the ministry who operated, in the period specified in Article 1, in those constituent parts of the former StB that were involved in the struggle against the internal enemy.

(3) The list must be compiled in such a way as to render it impossible to carry out changes in it and to supplement it; the pages of the list must be numbered throughout, verified by the ministry's round stamp with the state emblem, and firmly bound. Each part of the list can be arranged in several volumes. Once the list has been sent out, no supplements or changes to it may be carried out.

#### **Article 3**

(1) The ministry will publish the list in an appropriate manner and will send it, in particular, to the CSFR Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council, the Slovak National Council, district offices, and, in Prague,

to the Municipal Office of the Capital City of Prague and to the municipal district offices of its boroughs, no later than

(2) For the purpose of this law, the day of publication of the list is understood to be the 15th day after the ministry sends the list to the bodies listed under section (1).

(3) Official extracts from the list can be made only by the ministry for the needs of courts.

#### **Article 4**

As of the day of publication of the list in accordance with this law, the provisions of Article 19 of Law No. 451 of 1991 Laying Down Some Additional Prerequisites for the Execution of Some Posts in CSFR, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic State Bodies and Organizations will not apply to the data contained in the list.

#### **Article 5**

The publication of a list of citizens identified as persons listed in Article 1 by anyone but the ministry will be treated as a criminal act and will be punished by a jail sentence of six months to three years, or by a financial penalty.

#### **Article 6**

This law goes into force on

#### **Footnote**

Article 2, section 1 of Law No. 451 of 1991 Laying Down Some Additional Prerequisites for the Execution of Some Posts in CSFR, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic State Bodies and Organizations

#### **Pitner Views Credibility of StB Files**

el 1015980/92 Bratislava PRAVDA  
in Slovaki 6 May 92 pp. 1-2

[Interview with Slovak Minister of Interior Ladislav Pitner by Frantisek Melis on 5 May in Bratislava: "Each of Us Could Be in the Register"]

[Text] [Melis] Mr. Pitner, could you tell us your opinion on the so-called screening law?

[Pitner] This law has shortcomings that it need not have, had there been consultation with individual prime ministers and their interior ministers prior and during the discussion of the bill in parliament. Representatives of the Slovak Republic demanded, for example, individualization [individualizacia] of this law to prevent its blanket application to individual categories. They wanted the law to apply only to those StB [secret police] members and to the network of StB agents involved in the so-called struggle against the internal enemy. The Federal Assembly did not accept these comments, however, so the law acquired dimensions that are precarious, to say the least.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Metin] It is generally known that within your Department you approach the enforcement of this law, if not with outright indifference, then at least with detachment.

[Pittner] On no account do I approach the law indifferently. Quite the contrary, from the very beginning I have regarded it as essential from the viewpoint of the security of this republic. As we understand it, however, the screening law applies only to those [StB] members who worked against the internal enemy. On the other hand, we have extended its application to the intelligence component of the Border Guards, which proceeded in a highly inhuman fashion, particularly in the struggle against the internal enemy. Ever since I took up the post of interior minister, we have not hired anyone who formerly worked in that field, even if he successfully passed screening by the civic commissions.

[Metin] Could you give us a brief description of individual categories of StB collaborators? What conditions did, for example, an informer (dovozka) have to meet?

[Pittner] I can say, based on the knowledge that I acquired while working in the intelligence service in 1990, that StB informers were people who were important as a potential source of information, as is the case everywhere in the world. They did not even have to know that their information was being used by the StB because it used to contact them under various pretenses and these people served it only as valuable sources of information. They did not have to know that.

[Metin] Does that mean that any citizen of this republic could belong to that category or only people whom the StB selected?

[Pittner] Anyone who was interesting for the StB from the viewpoint of information could be registered in that category.

[Metin] Does that include, for example, people who used to travel abroad on business?

[Pittner] Of course. This category also includes, for example, athletes and priests who were pinpointed by the StB as important sources of information. The StB used them without their knowledge.

[Metin] What is concealed behind the term "candidate of secret collaboration"?

[Pittner] This was someone who was not just pinpointed as a source of information that was of interest to the StB but someone whom the StB considered a potential collaborator. Again, he still did not have to know that the StB kept him on file as a candidate for secret collaboration. Many people in those categories, however, were consciously providing the StB with information because the StB, too, had to test these people. That does not mean that they automatically became secret collaborators. Certain criteria played a role here that are applied by every intelligence service with regard to its sources of

information. Only from the sources is it possible to determine whether the information was provided unconsciously or consciously.

[Metin] In other words, no one registered in those categories had to pledge in writing to cooperate with the StB.

[Pittner] The so-called act of commitment was not set as a condition for the activity of either an informer or a candidate of secret collaboration.

[Metin] Let us now move to the categories that required written consent to cooperate. I am thinking of holders of conspiratorial apartments and agents.

[Pittner] These are broader categories. We used to refer to them in our slang as Theresas [Terezky], that is, secret collaborators, which comprises holders of conspiratorial apartments, agents, and resident agents. In these categories it was necessary to carry out a so-called recruitment operation [verbovka] and, on the basis of its outcome, to file an act of commitment. In the absolute majority of cases, this act took written form. The relevant person pledged in writing to consciously collaborate with the StB, either as holder of a conspiratorial apartment, agent, or resident agent, with the last applying only to the most successful individuals.

[Metin] Was the StB content with a mere written consent to cooperate?

[Pittner] There did not have to be written consent. For several years it sufficed to conclude the so-called recruitment operation with an act of commitment, which means giving oral consent to collaboration in front of two StB officers. Such a commitment to collaborate carried the same weight for the collaborator as a commitment in writing.

[Metin] Based on what you have just said, is it possible to regard the list [of Czech and Slovak journalists identified as StB agents] published in TELEGRAPH and METROPOLITAN as credible?

[Pittner] I did not have the register of files at my disposal. If these people are featured in the register of files, then the list can be regarded as credible. It is possible, however, as I have learned from newspapers, that errors occurred when retyping the names. Even so, I regard the argument that the list is fake as not credible because at the time when the registers were produced, no force in our country, including the StB, could assume that the regime would fail and that it camouflaged certain things [as published]. Therefore, I believe that these lists are credible.

[Metin] Do you think that these lists are the last word of the Federal Security and Information Service or can we expect it to come forth with more?

[Pittner] Reporters from a certain periodical came to see me on Tuesday [5 May] with a piece of paper on which they demand that individual members of the government and other constitutional officials make the results

of their screening available to the public. It was a mistake to make the lists of journalists public. It was not a mistake from the viewpoint of TELEGRAF because journalists have an obligation to search for information of interest to the public. It was irresponsible of those who provided this report, marked top secret, to the newspaper. What happened cannot be undone, but now it would be necessary to find out who provided the report to the press. As privacy was intruded upon in this case, to say the least, I do not regard the situation as desirable. It is up to each one of us whether he is willing to disclose such private matters to the public. As far as I am concerned, I have no reason not to make public the results of my own screening.

#### Dienstbier Presents Rationale for Centrist OH

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[Text] of speech given by Jan Dienstbier, federal minister of foreign affairs, at the First Congress of Civic Movement on 16 November 1991 in Prague. "We Are Not Seeking Adversaries, Enemies."

[Text] Though we are publishing the speech given by the chairman of the Civic Movement at the first republican congress of the OH [Civic Movement] on 16 November 1991 in Prague, we are not doing so because we wish to provide an indiscriminating advertisement for one of the political currents. We believe it is a pity when an important successor of the Civic Forum and the traditions of the Czech and Moravian dissident movement does not have his own press platform and his thoughts on a program remain exclusive property of his activists. The Civic Movement has been criticized that its political profile is vague and lacks clear definition. Judge for yourselves whether this is true.

Masaryk believed that it would take 50 years before democratic principles and customs became firmly established. We have experienced 50 years of anti-democratic regimes. Thus extremism in our politics should be interpreted in this context. It is becoming apparent that even aversion to foreign supremacy and a common struggle against a totalitarian regime do not create love of freedom that recognizes the freedom of others, nor does it create social justice.

It is up to us to make the public aware that the dividing line is not between extremes, but that it runs between democratic, tolerant, and decent citizens who desire cooperation, irrespective of the party they belong to, and those citizens who succumb to the restricting ideologies of the left and right wings. It has often been demonstrated that extremes closely resemble each other, regardless of the difference in their ideologies. They resemble each other in one most important point, namely the means they choose to attain their ends.

Under the present conditions in Czechoslovakia we may be setting ourselves an extremely difficult task. Because there seems to be no sense of moderation anywhere.

Petty-mindedness and megalomania, optimism and collective zeal, political and nationalistic frenzy attract one another and mutually strengthen each other.

Freedom that does not apply to everyone is a lethal fairy tale. When we succeeded in regaining our freedom, we discovered that democracy survives through democrats but, coming from a situation where there was no freedom, we still tend to define freedom in some abstract form that is far removed from reality. Therefore we are seeking principles on which to found a political movement, which would provide a guarantee that we will succeed in preserving democracy. We have learned that individual freedom is unthinkable without the guarantee of human rights, a rule-of-law state, and without pluralism and competition among individuals transacting business. We had and still have plenty of parasitic redistributors of public welfare.

Social peace, if it is not to become a dangerous slogan of demagogues, is anchored in honest competition among creative citizens who own workshops, factories, and stores, of the people working in them, and of those who increase our educational and cultural values. In short, individuals who work honestly and who simultaneously serve not only their own interests but those of others.

If we really wish to be successful, we must implement free thinking and liberal policies. Policies that will not ask whether we are rightist or leftist but whether we are free; whether we have been successful in liberating ourselves from the black-and-white perspective installed in us since childhood. Above all, we must all de-Sovietize and de-totalitarianize ourselves.

Individuals who favor the right-wing-left-wing formula in politics sometimes consider liberal parties and movements to be rightist in economics and leftist in their respect for the freedom of the individual, human rights, collective autonomy, and social matters. This is not an absurdity as far as facts are concerned but an absurdity in respect to the concept of rightist and leftist. This century should have made us come to the tragic realization of what such separation leads to. It drove millions of people into the arms of fascist or nationalistic totalitarian regimes and others into the arms of communism. If freedom is to prevail, it must equally be political and civil liberty, national and cultural freedom, and freedom of enterprise. In other words, it must be human freedom. Only the understanding of the mutual interaction of all aspects of life, people and nature, can lead not to false freedom, not to anarchic freedom, but to responsible freedom.

However, we are not concerned with the tradition of rightist and leftist. But if someone should insist on this terminology, we will say that we are in the center. The pragmatic center. This center must spread as much as possible in both directions so as to leave as little room as possible for extremes.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Citizen Does Not Mean Mediocrity

However, the citizen does not mean anthropocentrism or individualism. It is a sense for moderation as one of the basic and valid political but also European values. Furthermore, as a human value. Such a citizen means equilibrium. Therefore we are not seeking adversaries or enemies on the other side of the barricade. We want to bring down the barricades. To the contrary, we are seeking those who wish to contribute to the creation of a free, democratic Czechoslovakia. We do not exist in society anywhere. We exist to win them for a common cause. Our only identity is totalitarianism, including the remnants of totalitarianism that have remained in each of us.

There was a reason why Ferdinand Peroutka often many years ago said that a lack of liberality is a lack of humanity. A liberal newspaper is a practical viewpoint, and liberalism is primarily concerned with the issue of freedom. The leader of the French Liberal Party, Pauline Antoinette, recently defined a good liberal party as one that is effective and stable, responsible and loyal to a free market in the economy, dedicated to civil liberty, social justice, and human rights, and international in its policies.

Not long ago you received proposals for our movement to join the Liberal International. I believe that it is our time to consider this. Apart from a only the Conservative and Socialist International's case, The Liberal International was founded in 1947 in Chile. Its Liberal Manifesto of 1961 guarantees its primary principles in the political sector. These are the legal protection of the individual and of human dignity, the decentralization of power, the improvement of the effectiveness of executive power and its parliamentary control. The leading liberal parties are, for instance, the German FDP and the Danish Venstre headed by Little Blaauw Jensen. Perhaps you remember how, during his official visit to Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1989, he invited not only the dissidents who were free to lunch but also Vaclav Havel who was in prison. Salvador da Magalhaes, one of the presidents of the Liberal International, stated shortly after the war that "The world never had a greater need for liberality, and the world never had a greater need for liberal support, because the ideas and ideals that perhaps modern civilization are now threatened more than ever before by dogmas and dogmas that are much more dangerous than those in the past." Communism and many fascist, nationalist, religious and other dictatorships have repeatedly confirmed his words in the present day.

Simple civic virtues, the love of truth, honest work, and above all respect for the opinions of others and national, racial, and religious tolerance, are never guaranteed permanently. This is particularly true in our country. Thus it is natural for the liberal parties of the world to unite in order to provide each other with information, to coordinate their activities, and to help each other.

The chairman of the International Union von Lambsdorff invited me to an preparative session which will take place at the end of November in Warsaw. If you give me the mandate to do so, I would like to discuss the methods of and options for cooperation there, and obtain information on the steps that must be taken for us to be admitted before the set deadline.

### Need for Citizens' Consensus

The Civic Movement is sometimes accused of retaining the positions of the Civic Forum. To a certain degree it is true, but I do not believe that it is something we're ashamed of. It certainly was not possible to preserve the CIF [Civic Forum], while it really did include too broad a spectrum of opponents to totalitarianism. In fact, it could not have been healthy to do so, although I still believe that we split up sooner than we should have. We had not yet finished establishing the foundations for a democratic, rule-of-law state; we had not realized the economic reforms, and had not clarified our common base. Many people left this way, and with the decisions drawing near they are, in fact, appealing to us to re-unify. Well, we were just the ones who decided to leave the broad current of citizens' consensus. It was those individuals who wanted something special, who thought they had a better formula for success than was offered by a joint approach. However, this does not mean that we are remnants. To the contrary, we are the ones who are convinced that cooperation is more important than advancing one's own special interests. We will naturally fight to attain the greatest possible success in the elections. But we are not trying to get power at all costs. We are not concerned with winning the elections, the victories, rather we desire the victory of an open political culture.

The simple logic of liberality points toward a movement even if it is organized as a party. Furthermore, we are beginning to realize that this is a rather schematic argument. We are a party of political conflict anyway, and everyone considers us as such. Perhaps we will arrive at some formal changes at some point. Perhaps we will even change our name if it proves to be expedient. At this time, it would merely be a forced action, which would hinder us in our objectives. But this does not preclude us from calling ourselves a liberal forum or free democracy if necessary.

However, it is not sufficient simply to adopt principles. They must be clearly included in our everyday policies.

The screening law can serve as an example. We, the Civic Movement, initiated it. The democratic version was adopted unanimously by the federal government. I emphasize unanimously. But it was adopted in a form that is counter to international agreements on human rights. The individual who advocated this form and who voted for it generally had good intentions. In reference to it, Adam Michnik said that this dispositional law should be legislation, but him and other

**People, Do Not Be Afraid** and other laws in the struggle against totalitarianism.

Many of us abstained from voting, and the few courageous members voted against it. Some of them abstained of voting with the communists. But that was not the main task we made. Our task was that we could not even keep an eye on each other well enough to oppose the concept of the law as a determined and unified measure.

(Otherwise we must get rid of several individuals at the beginning of our development.) I myself have been conducting hearings at the moment for over a year. I do not pretend to make progress against those very official positions. I like them altogether. But I do not feel behind the law. I take personal responsibility for my actions.

It may not seem so much, if many categories of people will not be permitted to hold public offices for a number of years. That is nothing compared to the way they treated us.

However, this will include some lawyers. Therefore, it will not be the types that old Communists will be eliminated. Therefore, it will be a big disappointment, and this would result in an even greater public depression and an increased lack of confidence in social change. This is because the true traitors will seldom stand enough to waste precious time for instance in people's mouths.

The classification of many groups does not recognize historical events. As a result, it leads to paradoxes, such as that a public prosecutor who was in the LM (Prague) - Milada, but refused to go into Wenceslas Square to suppress the demonstration, and was convicted, cannot just because of it, a true agent of the former secret agents or that Alexander Dubcek may be an spy, but not the head of his own office. If we wish to establish a democracy and a rule-of-law state, we must not diverge from this aim, even if we feel a strong urge to do so. In other justice must be blind. And each case must be judged individually. I will not give the idea of permitting yesterday's members of the StB [State Security] to decide on the fate of their former victims today. I know for sure that many, without justification, ruined careers of their records who never were agents.

### People, Do Not Be Afraid

One of the most dangerous concepts are totalitarianism and this does not refer only to the screening around the continuing expectation of a large sector of society that the state will again make everything for us. Czech people that people live in fear again. We say People, Do not be afraid.

Last week Václav Klaus, the Spanish prime minister, was here as a guest. He was asked how they had solved their problems. They did nothing at all. They thought that a democratic awareness was in itself democratic and could not be installed from above. And this proved to be correct. Almost no ex-Franco regime army would live in

the mountains and we had about 100,000 individuals of which religious minded human rights demonstrated their neighbors, and thousands joined. Of course, almost benefits they were not entitled to through their work. Simply put, we will no longer care for these people. We will not protect them in case there are changes. We will not defend them who fought against totalitarianism and they are against their suppression in the mountains or in the countryside. It is this kind of political courage that will ensure the fact that every member of the Civic Movement and the civil local movements, understand himself sufficiently.

The struggle against the consequences of totalitarianism and for human rights must be a very practical activity.

One of the basic human rights is the possibility for an individual to freely walk down the street without fear of being attacked or killed. Therefore we are asking of money that our Minister of the Interior, František Švec, has sufficient means to guarantee us this human right. We would like our ministry, Richter and Švecová, results to have the means to implement the legal and extra-legal rehabilitation of thousands of prisoners from concentration camps. In many cases there is a risk that they will not be able to receive a decent pension or retribution. They suffer a different fate than all the individuals who gather in the squares and about the de-Bolshevization. But doing the latter is easier than offering their work and their time to make up for what cannot be repaired.

As a result of last discussion is the benefits insured by the former powers that be, we abolished personal pensions. The grandfather of President Masaryk and many other pensioners had a difficult to afford a living. Even a minor solutions are the company, not at least in ensuring personal pensions for them.

In other communities it is possible to work toward ensuring the same goal. The building of human rights—the right to be a citizen of one's own community. The loss of the feeling of belonging to a community alternating with isolation in front of a television screen is one of the most serious consequences of totalitarianism. Communist policies start with Roberts in the forties and after ousted leaders for all in 1948. As used to be Zimmerman here a hundred years ago. It is up to the governments and parliaments to create legal guarantees for this. But even in this case the law and governmental decisions will not create a community links and this will not make us become aware of the fact that if we throw a cast iron bar neighbor's hand, we are throwing it onto our own.

### Economic and Spiritual Reform

Economic transformation is not a program that belongs to one party or another. It is the absolute necessity to repeat of the present modern form of the rules by which all economic functions rules that have existed over many thousands of years.

But if we wish to succeed, we cannot compare the reform only to its economic and technical aspects. And certainly not to the realization of its new, this time economic, ideology. We can neither return to F. L. Václav's growth model, nor to the heritance of the first capitalists from a totalitarian economy. Neither social justice nor clean air are the only in the case; they are just the reward for produced wealth. They are integral parts of it. The reform will be successful if it will become everyone's cause. And we must work our way up to prosperity. Modern society has nothing in common with economists or with your Denevrem.

Not long ago, almost the whole present generation of Republicans came here on a visit. Since, the son of the last governor of New York and Republican presidential candidate, George Bush, made a very clear statement: It is not a matter of the economy but of democracy, including democracy in the economy. He said that the Democratic capitalism, which respects the environment and social issues, cannot work. One must have an honorable government that is concerned with the good of the people.

We not only need to have political parties but political will.

However this means more than statements about loyalty to the reform, it also means the acceptance of responsibility for its realization. This is all the more true since we are a governmental party that entered the elections and the governments with the promise that it would do everything it can to implement it. Therefore we must not only constantly monitor its development and continuously fine-tune it according to the findings we obtain during its realization. We need to find partners among entrepreneurs and employees. We do not want to be a party for the rich or rich for the poor. We want to be a party for free and responsible citizens, who will contribute, each in his own way but together to the development of democracy and prosperity.

There is no such thing as an abstract economy. An economy exists when people using their abilities and skills strive to perform an activity in order to make a living, to consume it off, and fulfil their desire. The economic policy is also a very practical activity and something or breaking the same with one's fist is out of place.

Yesterday's commentary in *MLADÁ FRONTA DNES* for example, shows how attempts are constantly being made to disorganize the economy. The author criticized the ČSS's economic policy, saying that it is contradiction because it agrees with what is called Károly reform but modifies it in a way that he would allegedly reject. In order to be more explicit, he gives an example. According to him, the issue is should we have a surplus or deficit budget? At this time I am not concerned with the fact that the author apparently never read our program. After all, we stated that we support all the major pillars of the reform, including a surplus budget.

That is just the truth. Our colleagues, Czechs, don't have the freedom to disagree in this way. As a matter of course this financial policy and institution of state budget we will have a deficit budget at certain moments but that is irrespective of the fact that both the end or supporting a surplus budget. Privatization, including foreign participation, should always be progressive. We cannot afford to disrupt the economy to such an extent that it leaves nothing left to private. We need to proceed as quickly as possible but not precipitously. We also have to adapt to old structures to the demands of our business who need sufficient time to submit appropriate plans. After all, our aim is to ensure that as many free Czech-owned businesses as possible can become dominant capitals of our industry. And considering the influence of external investors, we should make sure that the largest possible number of our business experts, and employees participate in its realization. The radical center of our right wing would like to replace compensation socialism with traditional liberalization. This would not be possible alone. Moreover, in executing an extremely successful reform and in privatizing 75 percent of its formerly nationalized economy, it obtained 6 billion in investments. Nevertheless, President Vaclav Klaus, one of the most modern economists, said on that it will take a long time to privatize the large enterprises, whether and when, when an sufficient and positive the environment. Therefore we must also have the necessary tools with which to integrate such enterprises into a market economy.

Fundamentalization of privatization is now dangerous in connection with agriculture. We think on Decree 100 presents cooperatives, but this law has no incentives of real owners based on the provision that property can only be created through the working of work and soil. It is not by chance that the law for the transformation of cooperatives has still not been adopted, although the federal government finally approved it in principle. Even the strongest advocates supporting the privatization of cooperatives know that there cannot be compensation for departing use of land. They then have a reasonable and considered approach: villages could have been where they stood long ago. They could have freely decided whether the farmers wanted to work alone or in some form of cooperation, such as new associations. The country already a hundred years ago has to estimate the damage caused by the unnecessary privatization of the cooperatives based on punishing and killing rural areas. It is becoming clear that the most effective form of controlling would be through laws that ban the monopoly of the media through free business activities. However dedicated we are to economic reforms, we did not forget in the town square two years ago like a value-added tax, although we do not doubt the importance of this transformation too. We know in that we must be free and must live the life of honest people.

We do not merely need an economic transformation, we also need spiritual and moral transformation. Three years of transformations, we presented a morally high

society and general education. Our basic documents—our laws—have one of the best qualified citizen forces. Despite everything, we preserved maximum cultural integrity. Therefore, when we do not read books such as "Treat a problem to the Bratislavians," we become concerned at a loss of our common cultural values. The last time books were banned this way was after World War II in Soviet Prague after 1948. At that time, it was for ideological reasons, today it is for historical ones. Our Action leads to the development of science, technology, and culture. As far as I do not know that occurring in Slovakia in the same, effective form of suppression.

What is available in the banning of our cultural documents and their reprint abroad? The argument that the International Workers' Fund refused to publish them is the loss of profit that may not be expected due to bad sales. Admittedly, legislation is not sufficient to deal with this. What is needed is the creation of cultural organizations. The people who will guard our cultural heritage. Our organization can play a considerable role in attaining this.

Many Slovaks and other cultural institutions are financing our education work in smuggling. If we were successful in this effort we will go death at the forum. This can result for our activities.

#### Organization of the State, Stability of the Region

You know the condition of our legislative and executive. The organization of institutions is confirming political fundamentalism, which, however, is theory a cover for a political lack of understanding of the need to stop a truly democratic common state after having had a communist state and independent fundamentalism.

A common way is an economic and security necessity. At this time no one can calculate the real economic losses that would be caused by disintegration or separation. No one can assess the extent to which economic relations would be slowed down. Although we may suffer less in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, we would still suffer considerably.

But I would like to point out a fact that is often overlooked: a separated state would change our political situation.

Slovakia would fall into the area of mediation that extends from Russia to Yugoslavia. The present Hungarian government as well as the opposition continue both their anti-communist and continuing of European borders, excluding borders with their own neighbors. But the logic of disintegration is guided by its own rules—as we can see in Yugoslavia—and the reaction cannot always be controlled. Mayor Kukurka has already stated that the Hungarian citizens are really free in the Czechoslovak Republic, but without a nationalistic principle he emphasized, they will demand the implementation of the same principle for those of Hungarian descent.

We also know that the international organization of the Soviet Union is the most brutal among the socialist states and the Soviet Union is the center of the world's most brutal war—the U.S.-Soviet war of aggression over the principles of the United Nations, which denies their autonomy. However, we also know that there are international forces at the Lester. The Lester is about as large as France. You about the same sort of population, but nuclear weapons are serious, and then a population even larger than that of Germany. If the international organizations were to be informed and were approached disinterestedly, we could present a strong alternative that would suffice for our security. We believe that is the case that such a friendly toward border at Novyky is a later condition. A new form of cooperation at the border would be a legend for the Czech Republic, and it would be easier to form such a peaceful border together, what is more, it would be easier to prevent such a border legend. The whole European society would benefit at home and outside, and especially will be possible to form stable relations and develop joint projects in these fields, which is the main problem of our country, the main problem of most, and in the future in which the war can be pushed further east. The common and single a national Europe will be the greater the possibilities of maintaining freedom in their places where it is still guaranteed.

Thus our greatest concern is a common value and in this our efforts is defined.

Modern European politics and economy development is oriented toward strengthening previous bonds and reducing national bonds. Poland is an example and reducing party system, but also a certain system of European integration. As a consequence, the importance of the national economy is reduced, and it is still to face losing the character of their own national system. The option will be either to end regional or ethnic disintegrating, or the risk of being completely merged implementing the system of European integration. So that this article whether we will be a weak or dominating factor of disintegration or through integration, will have an element of a stabilized Balkanized Europe, whether nationalism and party option will prevail over regional elements or whether we will choose a different way that is strong due to its nature.

If we wish to be a part of common interests in the political spectrum, we must also work this in the problem of maintaining a common base.

#### About the Czech Prime Minister's Speech

I would like to say this segment is important for a speech by the prime minister of the Czech government and the chairman of his government. The Prime Minister is quite familiar with the situation and the way to think for a long time. Therefore I think he is rather informed that his views are not much optimistic. He was speaking in the Novyky town. He was referring to the

fact that the other half of the truth—about Karel Baryš or the Slovaks—would be exposed by the other party. We will see whether and how this will happen. Jan Černochová is to speak on tomorrow's issue. A politician's speech can sometimes cover his personal views if he wants to repeat it a dozen times. But I would like to emphasize again that this speech was motivated by profound anxiety about the fate of a common state. And it was also a necessary demonstration of our commitment toward those Slovaks who would like to live well in the area without being threatened by their fear that they will again feel like second-class citizens in this common state. We may consider these fears to be unfounded and ungrounded. However, we know that in present conditions our opponents are, if not more eloquent than us, more argumentative.

A common state can only exist on the basis of the free will of both nations and other guarantees so we must be sufficiently flexible in the method and manner in which this free will is expressed. But when we have a common state, we must do more: we must have another kind of flexibility where we will consequently be exposing almost everything. A common state must be sovereign; there have to be the necessary forums in which to discuss external and internal security, take a stand on the international scene, create a unified monetary and economic policy, and ensure the same standard of human rights and social security. It is impossible to conclude directly from and not have a common state. If we cannot do this and agree on some other form of living together, on a confederation, or an even lower level, whatever happens, we must remain friends. But we have to discuss that this could benefit any of us. Therefore the Civic Movement is prepared to do everything it can to preserve a common state.

#### Civic Foundation

Yesterday at the meeting Přemysl Novák said that a series of negotiations toward the state and for the whole is being lost as a moral value. It is necessary to express protest and change. Our foundation was founded on Chapter 77 and the manifesto "Democracy for All." It was the result of searching constantly for the most effective political tool. All the more effective because it did not strive for power but for the victory of truth and justice. That was a real positive reason of the focus.

Politics is making a move away from practical politics to its opposite. It is our obligation to show that we are free-thinking and free. What is important is to be free.

Conflicts between parties should never give rise to a stage where the interests of the party are more important than the interests of society. Therefore we offer friendly-coalition negotiations to anyone who wishes to complete the democratic development and social transformation of society. Once again, this is not a dispensation of the center but our expression of freedom.

Lastly there has been much talk about national coalitions. We would like to work with greater efficiency the

other values. We will not be bound to the establishment or one of the pro-establishment factions. We wish to work in other words to obtain a result that will enable us to think that the liberal values will not be negated. Considering the growing extremism in political life, we must give the citizens a guarantee that defines a new kind of moderation, human dignity, recognition of the rights of each individual regard for the sexes and cultural trends and for the environment, in which the environment is preserved.

Today just as after World War I, we are facing the fundamental question of whether the progressive anti-fascist coalition of the right wing and the left wing will prevail, or a neo-fascist ultra-conservative concept of the world. Through the lessons learned from the history of totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century, we have a much greater chance of winning today. There have been more than enough total dictators and mass-murders. We also have support in the democratic part of Europe and the world, where the principles of democracy have been propagated over periods with corresponding success and prestige. In our country they were brought up good and many individuals who object communists often before the rightist Bohumilka. Then the free Democrats have a little share of paper in front of them. But this paper must be written on a democratic principle in all areas of life.

#### Klaus Discusses Civic Democratic Party's Future

APPENDIX 17 Brussels, 10:00 AM, 14 May 1982  
in Brussels 14 May 1982

Interview with Václav Klaus (the Czechoslovak Civic chairman and federal leader member in Bratislava) place and date no given. "Programme of the Progressive Bloc?"

[Text] (After) Mr. Chairman about form of constitutional arrangements with the Civic Democratic Party—after the elections?

[Klaus] It is clearly stated in the Civic Democratic Party's program, Freedom and Progress, that we will endeavor to achieve the present model of the federation. A two-chamber legislature with the regular right of veto is currently in danger of an indefinite constitutional crisis. We are concerned with certain difficulties that may be followed a federal—multicultural federal form and this would strengthen the ethnic minorities. The federalism should have its own administrative powers. We consider a common federal state—the multi-national state is possible—but for the time being.

[Text] What could split the common state?

[Klaus] Corruption. Serious corruption. We are in a difficult period of transition and have numerous reasons for dissatisfaction. This can cause other reasons to do something about our problems. Our difficulties can be compared to past events and to the a similar third-right and opposition to communism in view of the

(See interview 19) "The importance of social policies, for example. The social aspects of developing or making programs is just a basic. We are interested that some of the traditional functions of the state—like the Czechoslovak Central Statistical Bureau, and the publishing provide an opportunity to facilitate the implementation of the laws in the present legal and economic situation. There is no traditional Czech or the government representative, but the Civic Democratic Party accepts the direction of the laws."

**Karel:** The present form of the program, which is actually an intermediate part of the Civic Democratic Party's political policy. What are your views regarding the role the state is to play in economic development?

**Roman:** It is important to clarify that the term of the term that is changing. The state must work towards specific areas of which it has no responsibility. The second condition of our society is that the state can't do what it wants, the state has also a limited role. Economic situation and the monetary operation of the market. The state has to be an active organization from above in a situation by the administration of both business and society. The state should guarantee basic rules and law to live in more or less.

**Jana:** That's not the Democratic Party's view from the point of the Civic Democratic program itself as a central part of the party's underlying parliamentary platform and the core program. Then the party passed through some intermediate stage of development?

**Karel:** We are not having any internal conflicts like if the Civic Democratic Party is different—the main issue is the Civic Democratic Party is wide enough to accommodate a wider range of ideas and sufficiently flexible to accept differences. The Civic Democratic Party from other parties. Another as party chairman are not independent either. Let's say significant, and in the party it is not.

**Jana:** What sort of influences are accepted in the Civic Democratic Party in the form of forming government, economic and social—sort of co-operation with others?

**Roman:** In Slovakia, there used to a coalition with the Civic Democratic Party of Mr. Benes, and we are also close to the Club of New-Aligned Authors. We have a close agreement also with the Civic Democratic Alliance and are friendly with the Christian and Democratic Civic and Religious People's Party of Mr. Lajcak. They have the Civic right wing, enough for some changes. Collaboration with the left wing and with the Civic Movement—both cannot be in fact in left—right. In Slovakia we have a closer relationship with the Civic Democratic Party. We are also close to those Civic Democratic People's representatives who come in contact with the party of the Public Against Violence as a friend from the outside. We are closely working. On the other hand, the Civic Democratic Movement as a conservative organization between our party is another. In addition, we are in good terms

with the Hungarian Civic Party. There are also important links with the Hungarian Party of Democracy and Minorities, the Party of Communists, with the Social Democrats, and the Liberal Socialists. In respect to the foreign, the partnerships must be made at the initiative of many important players.

**Jana:** The actual results of what I would say now. Development of additional components with other Civic partners or Monarchs like a Civic Union, for example.

**Roman:** At the moment political parties are making up the Civic Democratic Party, with the Civic Democratic Party, the Party of Communists, with the National Civic Union, Monarchs, in the Monarchs the Civic Democratic Movement is one of them. Regarding the federal political party and the participation form of Civic program, however, I am not sure that the Civic Democratic party will have to talk with the National Civic party. The participation of the Federal Government and taking of the national power will be decided in position negotiations. However, and here I will bring to mind that the federal is another dimension. As a pragmatist, I consider any possibility in this respect, unless stated. The dilemma there are greater than I can put there about.

**Jana:** Are you also fighting the "Soviet" in them and power in being?

**Roman:** I think so.

**Jana:** The people have been very successful in their activities of bringing the power and an alternative and power. What do you say?

**Roman:** I think I see a pragmatic position. The opposition organizes itself the executive committee of the hand, and I cannot imagine even the most moderate political alliance, whether with the pro-government forces or push something through the parliament. In the government, where I have a close fit of several of the Monarchs members, I have seen only and as the elements of an extremely polarized government. I might mention some of feelings of unrepresented ones. Thus, because that it is often quite depressing. I believe that the citizens will enough who will have education power but rather the enough to pass through the in that I am considering it from the aspect of the national management of such a complex process as the one we are passing through, and far from the point of view of personal interests of bringing the power.

## OIS: ODA Negative Predictive Trace

10:45 AM 16 May 1990 (EST) - 1 June 1990 (EDT)

Report to David Steele - "Focus on the Right"

David is a joint publication of OIS and the ICIS. Civic Democratic Party and the OIS's Civic Democratic Alliance presented themselves as a government

parties to attack each other and to a considerable extent the elections to form a joint government coalition. This arrangement was extremely efficient, perhaps even and for all the various parties at the outcome of a political conflict between them no political parties had opposed the suggestion of all the partners on the left side of the spectrum.

Despite the fact that it was provoked by a certain form of politics which made that most difficult to give over a coalition, remaining more than non-cooperation than from any true policies. Many discussions, meetings, etc. were triggered by something for their own interests and finding a spot on the right of the political spectrum. Recently there were official meetings at the part of the ČDA which again rejected going into a government coalition with the Social-Democratic Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Even though the possibility of such an SNS coalition was supported by students and the ČDA never intended of anything less than the two are steps in that direction the suggestion remained here. Until the specific statement of Václav Klaus on the constitutional nature of such a step, the understanding of the ČDA was following their leader and no agreement was finally reached.

Today the ČDP and the ČDA undoubtedly are among the strongest partners of the Czech right. The ČDP movement gained an advantage even of a tenth one with an entry into the Slovak political scene where it started going into the elections with the ČSN (Club of Non-aligned Activists) and the Christian Party. Another significant advantage consists of the finally concluded coalition with Brno's ČDP (Christian Democratic Party), which has the value of pure gold for the ČDP in the form of the Christian-oriented voters who are unwilling to give their votes to the ČSS (Czechoslovak People's Party). But the real advantage is also the fact that the image of František Kálek, who is one of the few politicians maintaining a stable position in the ladder of political popularity, is also a plus with the voters. The ČDA, which is the last political option having crossed the threshold of the 1 percent rule, looks mostly for practical, utilitarian positions, of which it has in Daniel Kálek announced with pride at the Congress before us: 500 or more or much as it needs to cover the entire list of candidates. For the Czech voters, it will also undoubtedly be an important influencing factor that first deputy chairman of the ČSS (Joint National Council) Ján Kuciak was elected chairman of the party. He is not the one who is likely becoming a clear representative and voice of the majority of the Czech Republic. Both parties thus take care to pursue all the attributes of pro-business, pro-government conservative partners and what is more important they can constantly implement each other. It is therefore no more advantageous than the other merge. The fact that both parties are aware of their own responsibilities for the process of radical economic reform and the reform of the military system, which would return us on paper without their participation to a decisive share of the power

structure and place of oligarchs who have at the time when the present political system was

### Prague Explains SNS Intentions, Orientation

VLADIMÍR ŠTĚPÁN, Prague, 1/1992 (AVN) CZECHIA

[Interview with Jiří Procházka, chairman of the Slovak National Party, in Milan Krajewski (ed.) and others, "Let's talk about"]

Jiří Procházka (born 1946) is Sojka's a scientist and a politician. After graduating from the Soviet College of Engineers in 1964, he graduated in 1971 from the Department of Nuclear Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava with the degree of Doctor of Natural Sciences. After returning to Slovakia he became a leading research scientist and later obtained a research appointment at the Institute of Physics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAS). In 1984 he became a professor teaching the physical consequences of laser theory and conducted measurements in the environment of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. The influence of this treatment of the physical consequences of nuclear weapons (cf. [1]) which he articulated in 1981 was heard in the work. In 1989 he began working at the Electronic and Heavy Current Electromagnetic Institute (EHEI) at an independent R&D institute of SAS he renamed to the SAS Institute of Measuring Technology. Together with other colleagues he established in December 1990 a group called the Forum of Coordinating Community Working in Slovakia which became the organization of new institutions in Slovakia and was integrated both to the Federal and the Slovak Government. Procházka was one of the initiators of the independent Slovak Trade Unions and became their first general secretary. In February 1991 he was accepted into the Slovak National Council. In the late parliamentary election he was a candidate for deputy for the Slovak National Party. At present Jiří Procházka is the chairman in this party.

Question: This is an actually a question to you since a question like that has concerned not questions of the physical properties of society, material culture, polarization, temperature, etc. I am asking the last one not present political model. I think on that our political culture exists very similar conditions as the material one does. That means that material change is such an environment, as an economic and also material. The conditions is the process of separation, which, moreover leads probably to longer lists representing the values of right-wing. But this process will be caused by the existing relations. Other dimensions, the one reflecting our political culture in the next years?

Answer: The present political situation in Slovakia indicate that the political culture will be becoming more than separated. On one hand there is an oligarchic tendency to maintain the status quo of political or even stronger power. Some of the ČSSD and on the other hand at the same time the movement for the

independence of the nation's right to self-determination. Increasing numbers of citizens of the Slovak Republic are coming to realize that if we are to develop further as a nation, as a state as a country, we must make our own decisions, take our own initiatives and bear responsibility for initiatives. The motive behind the effort to sever our historical identity by means of state sovereignty is too often directed toward other nations, or the Americans. The desire is competition with all nations of the world. But such an attitude is not a true partner on the basis of mutual benefit. The national independence process is just another form of backward thinking brought on by education, as the proponents of sovereignty are trying to persuade us that a unique process which is affecting all of Europe, in fact, the whole world, has no need to think about Finland or Belgium, Catalonia or Spain, Scotland in Great Britain, or Quebec in Canada.

Everywhere people are striving for the same thing—separating their national identity by means of state sovereignty. The programs of the Scottish national party or the Flemish national party are practically identical with the program of the SNS.

The reality therefore is that national states are not an anachronism, but precisely the opposite, and the effort to stop this process is a struggle against a natural development. It is the same kind of logic as an effort to prevent a maturing person from becoming independent from being his own self from being an equal member of human society. To release one's own maturation is in fact the same thing as when an adult child returns to get his own house and continues to let somebody else make his decisions. It is unnatural!

Peace in the world, but also in an integrated Europe, can be achieved only if the individuality and identity of each nation is secured. But we must think of a man as the house of a sovereign owner who decides about its interior arrangements according to his own taste and needs, and who also chooses his best friends, and not as a power submitted to把他們的意志。If we think of state boundaries as the boundaries of the validity of certain legislative norms and not as a barrier to the movement of people, transportation of goods or cultural ties, we shall find that the basic arguments of the proponents of a common state are refuted. If we also refuse to be scared by our neighbors' own borders, are internationally guaranteed even if we become independent, we shall find that there is nothing left that could not be settled in international treaties. No problem traveling to Prague.

What is left, is a thus far unanswered question: What is the advantage for Slovakia in staying in the common state? Let's stop thinking naively that another state would keep us poor, or it can spend money on us. Enterprises of the Czech Republic (CR) and the Slovak Republic (SR) will do business with each other if it is economically advantageous for them, regardless of whether we are one state or two. To put it another way, in a market economy each enterprise is concerned first

and foremost with its own prosperity and with the best advantage for the individual citizen. Period.

If Slovakia were isolated now, what the advantage is Slovakia as a country of state would be, is in the third strengthen to take advantage of the differences between CR and SR. I rather imagine that in a market economy they would probably compete with themselves if they were not clear about what benefits it will bring them. And in negotiating a treaty between SR and CR before we are fully clear what we imagine the future relationship to be and what we expect from it, or to stand up to in front. The same applies to the drafting of the SR constitution. Instead of the Slovak National Council first deciding on a constitution, after 3 months of discussions several incomplete alternatives of the SR constitution were drafted. And so we are gradually where we were in March 1990. The most substantial difference is that a total age in March the relevant constitutional documents were cast in a negative document and now they are all in one.

[Augustine] Is the same Pál L. in whom János Csonka wrote in 1988 (autumn 1990). As a Hungarian I became accustomed a long time ago to the fact that I am a small player in a large drama whose political power affects a person's profession as for the service of the nation-state without exception. According to him, I am one of those who want to integrate Slovakia against the Slovaks into a single political community, and remain to Stephen's empire. From the point of view of the Slovak National Party, the Hungarian Left and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, I am something of an odd man out. When a person from these parties wants to gain popularity with the "audience," he only needs to pull out the "Hungarian card." Success is guaranteed. To integrate Slovakia with the Hungarian Empire is, you see, a feasible and very popular. It will gain votes at the upcoming elections. And so this kind question was actually raised in Comerio.

[Pál L.] And Nádas present says that we urge the other party to ourselves. It seems that Comerio is doing just that.

It is prima facie false with Righteous Slovakia with the Hungarian Empire. As the SNS (norman), I try to emphasize that Comerio is not a member of the SNS. I think that it is not proper for Comerio to insist that SNS is taking over resources for construction. Or say Slovakia is judge of Hungarians in Slovakia to Tibet?

It is the SNS opinion that the Slovak Republic as a sovereign state be the home of all its citizens without regard to nationality, race or religion. An independent SR will be able to provide even better conditions for the development of national minorities than they have been although most there are much higher than the European standard. So, but then Slovakia will no longer have to struggle to maintain their identity and will become the best. That's the situation is different. Today we are in

particular because many Slovaks are at least at the level of a liberal moderate in the CNS and believe in a more than ethno-nationalist program. Their opinion is not restricted to any particular mass element for the Hungarian it is concentrated in the Hungarian Republic. The Government here as elsewhere in Hungary is indeed a clear example of this. It has not had, and will also not have, anyone in support.

Augustin: Who did not begin in political activity at the Soviet political stage to reach the most progressive left? Many of us young ones discussed the KNS political goals in their propaganda, but others of progressive educational, professional status. They agreed to this, but perhaps more of all this is still the other party will help you in the political representation of a certain part of our rightist forces. Through the power of Austria, the Czech has also participated and take a position toward the proceedings, one will have to stand back however, in a few weeks. I am not sure if the representation of your party, before making preparations for the election campaign. What steps are you taking at this moment?

Petruš: KNS came into being spontaneously. When it became obvious that leaders of the "other" movement, our strong right, change the then consider the new-Soviet relations between Slovaks and Czech good, even necessary. They were satisfied with just passing over our S-Slovaks in their composition, and all they were. The party was born out of the desire of ordinary people without financial backing, but largely aimed against the taking of all the media oriented toward the new power. Although, even will bring to the surface over time have. Today is no clear in everybody that among party political elites there are some members who believe, people whose own ego is the very most sacred to them people who are not his their own benefit. Everything is a matter of time of gradual crystallization. People are less bound given to politics, in their work. There then arrived those most self their character and nature. I do not think that KNS has been, or is, better off in this regard than the other parties. They also had their members big and small, different people and different levels of behavior and political culture. The strength is showing in its many sharpener our program makes place middle among the other parties. The virtue is also part of preserving and the right message to gather with the world.

The situation is much different than the permanent hope of an audience. The audience have eliminated themselves. KNS before the elections is consolidated and attacks against us can come only from the outside.

Augustin: The main political goal of your party is a politically independent Slovakia, we must account for possibility of survival of our state. If I understand correctly, probably in the form a "semi-detached state" as it was called in the statement of the US Vice Minister Present. Let us say that the Slovak Republic becomes independent and will have to deal with the political and economic consequences of all to itself. Can it

arouse in Slovakia that is evident from the importance of political leaders of the Central European type of the one hand, and on the other from the number of its economic production as well as other aspects?

Petruš: First, an independent Slovakia is an international power means the Slovaks a desire to create conditions for an advanced development of Slovakia as a country, as well as of all its citizens. The very fact that an independence of a semi-detached state would also the members of the Slovaks power will create conditions for a multi-class development of national character living in Slovakia. These would cooperate with the Slovaks based on free State character of man by a single person and the international and ethnic origin. Second, we shall in our work compete with the majority Hungarians for the votes in the international stage. And third, are the fundamental differences that at the international stage we shall then compete with others for the same, but no longer for our place or role. Today we are fighting among each other within our state, and thereby the Slovaks nation is in a disadvantage, because for the non-being—when for example the Hungarians have their national identity maintained by the independence of the Hungarian state, the Slovaks do not have a established ethnicity and must still fight for it. This struggle is taking place within the CNSB, and we do not have enough strength and resources in the international stage. I would not teach them not even want to do so, the problem is that it is a continuing and exhausting struggle at the "international" level, which can end it non wins. But we shall give to our national identity and the national power to have a presence on the international stage, or what guarantees that participation in having Slovakia a subject of international law. Sixth, we must not give up our national character.

Augustin: used by the proponents of the common state and the one principle in a multi-national state, until 1918, with them are then, following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the birth of the CNSB. Czechoslovak Republic. After all, the argument for the establishment of the CNSB before the communists took over generally the right of nations to self-determination. And there are basically even stronger to do so at the common state, which are not measured by anything else. A Czech-Slovak union Czechoslovakia as the foundation not because for a commonality as the because he thinks of a, as does the other world, as the case of the Czech regime. The problem, the alternative is not the regime like we are known as "French" around the world. It is the result of a democratic long-lasting propaganda. But there is no better in learning the French. It is rather natural that the dominant nation in a multi-national state with the state as "mother" in addition. That, leaving from the outside, is also the case of the Soviet Union, France, Germany and our case is well. Today we all know that the greatest priority do not go to the president but to the chairman, and on communication with the world through a chairman under the banner

[Chairman Lajos] By advancing our state integration we shall reach 1993 as a better state. The goal therefore is not so much the integration of the citizens of the Slovak Republic as well as Slovakia as a nation, nor is the project but in cooperation with the national minorities living in Slovakia. It will be made possible only by a joint cooperation on equal terms with all the nations of the world, integrating into Europe as a country with equal rights, and all that will be possible only when we have a democratic, peaceful, pluralistic, independent state that can always live in peace to all its citizens and creates the opportunity for developing naturally in accord with internal and external requirements.

[Chairman Lajos] And discussing which form of economy to develop between market economy has proven itself over the world. Since our goal is an all-around development, we shall search for a national state based on both the cooperation with all other states. That is our ambition, but a common means substantiated by the common basis of the human race as well as by the common characteristics around the world. Practically all nations that want have the same problems we have. Whether it be Great Britain, Spain, France, Belgium or Canada... If Pálfián's semi-detached house is to be built, if there should what kind of advantages it has for us in comparison with our independence, and at the same time reflect who the Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Germans etc. are striving to achieve their standard.

My have experienced with a communist state for 70 years. It did not have a good record. We experienced with socialism on the way it came to us from Prague. It did not have a good record. Therefore we shall now search for something that has proven itself around the world. A national state and a market economy. If there must be better positive synergy for us in a closer link with Slovakia, fulfilling the goal we set for ourselves that is an all-around development of Slovakia, it will show up pretty quickly and naturally in the cooperation of two independent states. Let us put them before we have a falling out, and let us cooperate on the basis of mutual benefits and leave our future relations to a natural process. Let's not be afraid of parting. People associate together if it is to their advantage. As soon as it comes to the advantages, the association breaks up. So why, after all, remains a member of a club only so that the chairman can be a chairman. Proponents of a common state have been simple since the summer of 1990 even as much as in formulating the real advantages of a common state. Let us not stop in the common state just on the national Hungarian can continue to exist or that somebody can spend money on us. We are not, after all, parasites. We are living at a time when it seems as if history has proceeded. Everything is changing, what used to exist in communism has turned to dust, and the glory of the communist regime has gone with the wind. A national-state-building movement is visible all over the world. If we shall not sleep through these times, we shall get up and act. Otherwise, we might close the door on ourselves forever.

We cannot think an independent Slovakia separately, we cannot change geographical situation. Therefore we must take them into consideration. The fundamental reality is that we are in a very small and unusual country that lies on the border-line between Germany and Russia, and lies in a corner, beyond which a new culture of power begins. We have been from long accustomed the central-European thinking line between culture and politics. It is mostly a political-national Hungarian territory. Especially for those who cannot get on with their closest neighbors. The first educational group of issues is concerned precisely with our neighbors—Hungarian, Poles, Slovaks, and the Czech Republic. We have no doubt that we could be good neighbors with them and have cultural, economic, political and cultural relations. Most of the problems, a series, judging by the political ferment, will be with the Czechs. The nearer we separate culturally, the better relations we shall have in the future. There seems to be a certain impediment, especially in the historical sense, in the relations with the Hungarian Republic. Even here there are ways, at least today we find mutually good relations Slovakia needs from Budapest a clear word, a clear guarantee, which will move the shadow the past is casting on the present. And we after proclaiming state sovereignty will gain, in a natural, a certain psychological disposition for viewing differently at the problems of the Slovaks south not as a danger but as an individual part of a single entity. This could be said and must be emphasized in Budapest. Beyond this point our relations will certainly become better.

We could talk about common measures and possibilities but as long as we do not have the decision in our hands—political sovereignty, it is still some what up in the air. We have no idea about strategy, more or less important issues, possibilities, where what we need and what we can offer. We are also taking practical action, making contacts abroad with political representatives and entrepreneurs. This should be done basically to the government. We realize what the present government will leave for the new one, and so we are doing a few things ahead of time.

[Question] In case of an attempt at an authoritarian, ultra-nationalist situation, if the unconstitutional referendum were to pass in force, secured firmly by the presidential regime or even by the bureaucratic government, with strict security measures in place, how would you as an MVS representative react to such a situation?

[Palosi] As a politician, I would turn to constitutional institutions. As a deserved citizen I would go out and demonstrate. Protests and that is the parliamentary government, as well as the president do not have power; they are merely its trustees. The power belongs to the citizens of this country. Even the constitution of the United States gives in the safeguards that is the right not only to protest but also to ACT if someone usurps power. We are a party that is represented in the parliament, albeit as an opposition in party, but one that respects

In the last document the possibility of finding a noncommunist way out of any kind of situation. Moreover there is no pessimistic expectation as a strategy. I believe that the communists is more weaker than before. It is a fact of course, that the new power is well prepared and is building its basis and so on, but on the other hand it will also find and try together and themselves know that our people are very knowledgeable politically and continue to follow political developments. I do not think that the election of November will allow communists to be reelected. Our way ahead, and if they do, then as a nation we do not deserve anything else but that somebody else take over.

[Applause] We have attempted a kind of peaceful future which goes through us in a very broad interpretation. Let's take this situation and go from the democratic center right to our surroundings in a prudent, or to put a better point in a numberous form our neighboring states and right to our situation and what would be the interpretation of their reaction for us.

[Applause] It would be a mistake to wait and see how the neighboring states would react. We must know that at the time we practice our sovereignties, we must have a continuity of work. That is the case for the diplomats before the last election. Who does Minister Drahoscek claim to want independence toward our Soviet minister of external relations, who is the Soviets and of course Party in the diplomatic service and foreign trade? Foreign trade goes after all hand in hand with diplomacy because a political interest is a traditional interest of another kind—more often than not commercial interests. That is also the root of the response to the majority of others toward us. What we are offering them, and what they want from us, we are in the position of a "crossroads" a bridge, a buffer zone. Today the biggest markets of the 20th century are opening up for the West in the East especially in Russia. That is a negotiation which we must expect, build our programs on it, and not put up obstacles to it. Even we are mentioned more for example in our building efficient infrastructure roads, telecommunications. The world will try-punish and ignore us notwithstanding and then give punishment, it will do us no good to whine at home about a confrontation against Germany and I don't know what one "foggy" plan where there are communists and informants.

There is an element of a crisis in this region. It would be no dangerous area for West Europe. Our's saving of course is the stability of the situation has only one goal—to support a confrontation between the communists and the Soviets nation, that is the classic "divide and conquer".

[Applause] Let's now talk about the arts, literature, and culture as a whole, which are linked directly to subjects of politics and therefore with us. We all know how bleak the cultural situation is from the aesthetic point of view, but in spite of that there appears now and then a good book, a good movie or a play. Tell us what books, movies or plays interested you most recently and why?

[Applause] It will be an easy choice and difficult. Recently I will write a book to Tomas Batiha—Farewell poems and fragments. The First Circle is interested me because of its importance of Douglas' book during a period that showed him not only as a communist from which you can find people who represent a continuity of communism instead of changing conditions for democracy and understanding themselves as a "clerk". As a communist it is not possible to change people with the same idea for building society in any way different from the government's. In a democratic country I cannot suggest that a deputy chairman of the parliament's committee is for a deputy's program to vote and keeps his government. Because this man is a part of society's culture. Democracy respects the right of others. When a communist who represents itself in a democracy and does not do so suggests a "Political majority of a country" that also a particular country that he respects that rights of others are because he is afraid of the law, but because he considers it the right thing to do. Because it is natural for him to do so. Persecution good can only through self-aggression measures. An effort to gain advantage at the expense of the others, to "get the better of them". Democracy leads to a breakup.

The conception of CNS policy is based on the sovereignty of the citizens, from which derives the sovereignty of a community region as well as the state. We are offering citizens the best conditions. A program for creating conditions conducive to their all-around development.

#### Cards Accused of Counting Bajenek's Recognition

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11 April, 1989 4/26/89

Information to Milos Bajenek. Playing With a Net at the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia?

[Applause] Although the representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) have been denied the a considerable political and ideological spectrum inside the movement, the same never so much as affected its internal communication within it. Our Soviet party gradually accepted a so-called "bread-based leftist movement" utilized by Vladimír Mečiar's personality. Nevertheless, with major as usual and always that the only thing that holds all together is their desire to win the elections.

That was one of the reasons why the news that the leader of the MDS's election campaign, Jan Bajenek, had resigned for just some last Wednesday to a lightning hit in the air. The representative of the ČSTK (Central-Slovak Press Agency) announced that an "informanting number" of members of the central election team had also submitted their resignation because "the political leadership of the movement had been dealing with problems from the position of closing rather than opening".

However, when we called on Mr. Breyer's secretary and asked him to explain and justify his statement, he refused to make any comments because, as he said, he had to discuss it with the political leadership of the HZZS first and only afterwards would he consider giving the press more specific information.

It is no secret that for quite a while the current Czech political representation has been pursuing an objective to split the Slovak political entity apart. It gained some ground not only because several Slovakian armed forces were unable to find a common language during the process of Slovakia's reorganization, but above all because they were pursuing their own narrow personal interests and goals. The Czech politicians knew full well that a split in the HZZS would even more disorient Slovak citizens.

Thus Prague would enjoy setting itself ruling the Slovak bone fide. For that reason, it is doing everything possible so that the federal government may grasp the state in its hands even more firmly.

#### Contents of Ideas of Czechoslovak State Examined at Journalistic Seminars LITERARNY TYDZIENNIK in Czech 12 Mar 91 p 17

[Article by Zdenek Eis. "Correlation and Conflict—in the Philosophy of Slovak History"]

[Text] I am deeply convinced of the fact that today's Czech democrats who speak of and express themselves in Slovak affairs must virtually always begin with the following words: "I am convinced that the Slovaks are a constitutional nation and independent nation with their own intelligence and, as such, they have the right to be an independent nation, but naturally also state independence, provided they prove an interest in it and will wish to manage it themselves." This is also my belief.

In short, the Slovaks have the right to be independent all the way through secession—this is the language of the fundamental democratic law which is involved in any kind of consideration of coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks. I will say it honestly: I cannot tolerate it when Czechs speak of Slovaks as though they were secessionists. This is a threatening and insulting for Slovaks. They, and only they, have the right to decide freely about their political fate on the map of Europe. So what kind of separation is that? Sure, following the historical experiences of the first republic, we will not today return to making the old mistakes, when the label of "autonomist"—let alone "separatist"—was the same as the mark of Cain.

Czech specialized journals really did forget a little bit about the 100th anniversary of the fundamental discussion on the philosophy of Czech history, as was so well pointed out by J. Janáček (LITERARNY TYDZIENNIK, No. 6, 1991). All great Czech experts returned to the problem of the philosophy of Czech history and its meaning and each of them wrote a book on this topic or

at least an important article. I saw at the 10th Congress for the Meaning of Czech History because—a Czech, a logically Czech disease. Within the framework of this disease we completely—either more seriously—wrote our history and our function in European history, which tended to lead other countries to not understand who we are, to understand returning to our roots when one has long since abandoned and far more important matters than the search for the meaning of Czech history were appearing on the program—for the Czechs.

More than 20 years ago, Karel Kuna returned to deal with this problem in connection with the Slovaks. He was writing about the Czech-Slovak conference which I have previously adopted as an "expression of faith" and according to which I adhere to this day. Kuna stated:

The Czech question is a world question, but the practical test for the worldliness of the Slovak question is a certain issue, we can even say that the essence of the Czech question is made up of the Slovak question. Separatism or indifference with regard to the program of federalization is not only an act of indifference and indifference toward a closely related nation, but is primarily a manifestation of insecurities of and weakness in political thinking. The Czechs and the Slovaks are historical nations that, personally, they are gradually becoming nations with equal rights, nations which are establishing a state nation which is maintaining a state nation which determines the character of the state.

The Slovaks never experienced such a serious discussion regarding who we are—our identity—and whether we are found. For the Czechs, this discussion began 20 years ago and is now as acute as from the beginning of the program to this day. The well-known position of Milan Hodek and Josef Šesták dating back to 1920, never assumed such dimensions and depth and tractability with a repetitive amount of heat reading as did the Czech discussions. Maybe the Slovaks were able to discuss many things much earlier than the present moment. Let's be said that not even the Slovak articles and positions on the meaning of the Slovak nation give rise to confusion. I have in mind here particularly the Slovák endem. Let us recall, as random, such people as Matúška Tóthová and a number of others and their efforts to grasp the Slovak identity.

It would seem that the approach used Dr. J. Janáček, in those articles on the philosophy of Slovak history which deal with the problems of and the idea of Czechoslovakism, which, unfortunately frequently being degraded into Czechoslovakism, will give rise to polemics.

I have the fear that it is clear from the position of the year 1991 to criticize the proclamations as well as the Czechoslovak struggle and, at the same time, disregard the status of events in Slovakia. As for myself, I think and that I am far from being a defender of

**Czechoslovakia.** This is a kind of among others, to do with from the time it when I was just "permitted" to deal with Slovaks.

Those who proclaimed their Slovaks were born as a result of a certain historical and spiritual discontinuity of Slovakia at that time based on the Hungarian administrative division of the Slovaks, as a result of the search for a way out from the spiritual crises of social effect caused, as a result of the focus regarding the fate of the Slovak people and as a result of the search for cultural elites. Those willing to acknowledge their Slovaks were receiving spiritual assistance. It is true that Bohemia did, in end of itself this caused the discontinuity. And anyway, let us remember the status of Slovaks in Slovakia from the times of the last century until World War I and the peace.

In 1918, in Mikulovice (Mazura) winter in 1919, when the Slovaks were giving themselves with the Czech Lands they were in a catastrophic situation. At that time Slovakia did not have a single District administrator or an established town who would profit by the nationally-culturally conscious Slovaks. In those days, the majority of the establishment in the state offices did not know Slovaks and were unable to conduct business in the Slovak language. Among thousands of regional officials of the day, there were no such Slovaks, four nationally-conscious Slovaks were among the postal Service of the day. Of all the priests in Slovakia, a total of 61 acknowledged Slovak nationality and there were 11 priests who did not of the Catholic clergy, a mere 11 percent acknowledged their Slovak origin and 61 percent of the Protestant ministers acknowledged their Slovaks.

In 1918, Slovaks were had Hungarian government. There was a total of 55 gymnasiums and lower high schools employing 800 professors. Of the number of professors, only 12 acknowledged their Slovak mother tongue.

Under such conditions, it was impossible for any kind of state administration other than the Hungarian state administration to operate in the territory of Slovakia in 1918.

The Slovaks did not have sufficient forces and an appropriate number of people from the intelligentsia to fully handle their own state administration.

At that time, Slovakia required expert assistance. The most natural assistance was being offered from Bohemia. For reasons of linguistic closeness on the one hand, as well as for reasons of sympathy which the Slovaks enjoyed in Bohemia as an oppressed people. Thousands of Czech teachers, professors, officers of all types of qualifications, were leaving for Slovakia in the year or shortly thereafter the Slovak intelligentsia and to educate the young generation of Slovaks which would subsequently take over the administration of their affairs. Many young Slovaks of that time were leaving in such a Bohemia and in Moravia. In 1918-19, the Czechoslovak

Republic assumed in working and running Slovakia, following a new intelligentsia which was not numbered by Hungarians.

The Slovaks, notwithstanding gradual, temporary and strengthened, still no political, economic, and cultural distinctions began to be formed, which the Slovaks were before assumed—natural, especially the idea about the Slovak National Theatre and many other national movements. This is a basically the continuation of the mutual relationships between a youth and Slovaks.

And, therefore, in these circumstances we allowed Slovaks "Slovenské Slovo" (including M.R. Štefánik who participated with Jozef Tiso regarding the status of the Slovak people and who worked to assist all Slovaks with Bohemia, and a few years later, M.R. Štefánik also had the name B.G. Štefánik, M.R. Štefánik) who demanded the cancellation for creating a Czech-Slovak State, we need to compare in another "Slovenské Slovo" which has been done in Europe while we Czechs were struggling at the time that we were the ones making our country toward Europe.

As far as the much-discussed and discussed Czechoslovakia is concerned today, it is of course, both our aspiration and hope understandable or in more sophisticated form—that is to say in the stage which is called national Czechoslovakia, as far as possible the Slovaks surrounding the final result of Slovaks' independence in 1918 and perhaps the desire concerning the Slovaks for a multi-lingual Federation and a number of other issues above the Slovak language.

As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, I think that a certain historical movement which has been described here and has been lost. First of all, we should respect the acknowledged nature of the Czechoslovak political and cultural movement and its targets—the Slovaks and the Czechs. The idea of Czechoslovakia is very measured in the point that it became appropriate to both nations and, mainly, their mutual and a common political idea, as was and is the case in Slovakia and where anyone who speaks German, French, Italian or the Romance language actually regards the Slovaks.

The political idea of Czechoslovakia, which would be a supreme national model right by its commonality and the sovereignty of the Slovaks, both politically and otherwise did not gain hold in the country at the present time and did not fully implement.

In his article, Jurajčík writes that "there can be no doubt that our national resistance and power can be that of the Czechs—a truly collective record in a close bond with the rest-of-all-Czech people." This, however, calls for a new working out of the idea of Czechoslovakia based on the phenomenon of Slovaks but also on the basis of the full enjoyment of rights of both nations. I think today's practical implementation—both the Czechs and also the Slovaks—in finding theory in the material advantages of cooperation among both nations. I want to

political and economic—let alone a material advantage—in a sufficient support for and foundation of political cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks in a single state.

Now, at today's press-conference—neither Czech nor Slovak—have come up with a new political idea of state co-operation between both nations (at an already step away from their federal consciousness)—a law on the mid-Slavic something definitive, something unacceptable to Slovakia. Personally, I do not want for Slovakia to feel like minors in their own state, as Jancovc said it, or a future possibility that our certain state of co-operation with the Czechs.

The Czechs and Slovaks are two state-forming nations in Europe as one who contemplated. Let us tighten up in an article formulate the present idea of Czechoslovakness and, finally, let us take that which comes to from the spiritual area. Let us never again be deceived into thinking that the cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks can be concentrated without conflict. The Ruthenian compensation in the brotherhood of Czechs and Slovaks, dating back to the time of treaties, were and are a camouflage used to conceal the actual relationship between the two nations.

The relationship between Czechs and Slovaks in state co-operation cannot be based only on material advantages for both nations. An open problem, because it is a problem which has not been fully formulated remains in the form of the mutual and moral problems of the political and state co-operation between Czechs and Slovaks. Thus far, we are hearing very little about the aspect from the press-conference—both on the Czech and also on the Slovak side.

#### **Overview of Ruthenia's Past, Present**

ANNUAL Prague DRAFTMENT AND PUBLISHED  
in L. 1989, 19 Mar 40 pp 40/74/1\*

[Text]

#### **Facts—4 USSR Regional Problems 1—Ukraine Regional Problems**

##### **Subcarpathian Ruthenia**

Subcarpathian Ruthenia is the historical name for what is now the Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine; it was officially established by the Treaty of Saint-Germain in September 1919, which designated this territory as a part of the Czechoslovak Republic.

In the Zemiansko (Trans-Litava region), during the time of Austria-Hungary, the name for this region was "Upper Hungary"; after World War I, the Hungarians called it the "Russian Country," Russians called it "Transcarpathian Ruthenia," and the Ukrainians, who believed they had a claim to it, called it Transcarpathian Ukraine or Transcarpathia.

##### **History**

This country's history has had periods of stability and the Turkic, Tatar, and Mongol invasions. In the 13th century, the Germanic Ruthenian tribes—known as the Ruthene Country—already existed in the land of the Carpathians. Under Prince Lubomir, however, it was broken up by the advancing Magyars who founded several cities—Ungvár, Berehovo, and Čáslav. Starting in the 10th century, the Serbs began to migrate into the Carpathian areas—eventually—their descendants who had returned around them. The Czech historian Dr. Karel Knoblauch tried to determine whether the Ruthenes had formed a part of the Greater Hungarian Empire. Probably not, although they traded frequently with it, probably A.D. 900.

In the thirteenth century, the region was subjected in a wave of German colonization which reached the banks of the Vistula river via Bohemia and Moravia. The area remained isolated up to the Hussite movement. The domain of the Czech King had areas in Bratislava included Kuruc, Bardejov, Levoča, Prešov, and the western portions of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. At that time, the first literary works in the Ruthene language appeared in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. However, the did not last long as all national economies were pulled by the Hungarians. This country remained under Hungarian then Austrian, and later Austro-Hungarian hegemony for the next 500 years. During the reign of the Habsburgs, the Turkish Wars and the coming of the Hungarian nobility took place. The Ruthene citizens suffered greater poverty and hardship than any other part of Europe. The Ruthenes were the only nation in this region that did not cease to own nobility—indeed, less even the aristocracy. In the nineteenth century, the economy began to revive—and its representatives participated in the Székely Congress in Prague and held talks with Franklin Pierce. These negotiations led directly to independence at the end of World War I. Béla Kun, the President of Armenia, played a significant role in this process, as he outlined a plan for a common state with the Czechs and Slovaks to the spokesman of the American Ruthenes and Ukrainians.

##### **Integration of Subcarpathian Ruthenia into the Czechoslovak Republic**

After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I, Subcarpathian Ruthenia became a part of the newly created Czechoslovak Republic. Hungary's attempt to retain a state union with this region failed. During World War I, Ruthenes who had emigrated to America (further see the Novak) left in large numbers from the Hungarians. Some of them retained the nature of the nation and of their culture; many, however, did a union with Russia. Not after the Bolshevik revolution, the predominance of the Russophone culture was lost and the orientation turned toward the West. On 1 November 1918, the National Council of the Ruthenes in the United States demanded the union of Subcarpathian Ruthenia with Czechoslovakia. The ultimate

was not unanimous even the representatives of the Ruthenes and Ukrainians at home, but ultimately they all accepted the decision of the emigrants at a meeting of the National Council in Uzgorod, where autonomy within the framework of Czechoslovakia was proclaimed. In the United States, T.G. Masaryk and the Ruthene representative, A. Zatkovic, drew up an agreement on future coexistence. The conflict between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania (which had occupied the eastern part of the country) was resolved by the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 and the Treaty of Saint-Germain on 7 September 1919 which designated Subcarpathian Ruthenia as an autonomous part of Czechoslovakia. The Treaty of Trianon confirmed this status on 4 June 1920. The border with Romania was established by the Treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920.

According to the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which stipulated that "Czechoslovakia undertakes to establish the territory of East Carpathian Ruthenia as an autonomous unit within the framework of the state of Czechoslovakia," Subcarpathian Ruthenia was to become a self-governing unit with the broadest possible autonomy; it was to have its own parliament and its own governor. Despite the fact that these provisions were anchored in the 1920 Czechoslovak constitution, these constitutional and international obligations were ignored for almost twenty years.

#### **Autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Vienna Award**

During the First Republic, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was beginning to move from Medieval backwardness to the civilization of the twentieth century in many respects. However, it only succeeded in approaching it in a few areas over almost two decades.

During the second half of the 1930's, tension began to increase in this region, too. Hungary began to make territorial claims both in relation to Slovakia and in relation to Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The Czechoslovak-Hungarian talks in Komárno in October 1938 were an attempt to resolve these problems peacefully. But no agreement was reached.

It was not until pressure was exerted by Ruthenan and Ukrainian nationalists in the second half of 1938 that the Czechoslovak Government started to meet its obligations in regard to Ruthenan autonomy. On 11 October 1938 the first autonomous Ruthenan government, headed by Andrej Brada, was appointed (on 26 October 1938 Augustin Volosin replaced him as the head of the autonomous government). Then, on 19 November 1938, the National Assembly approved the constitutional law on the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and on this foundation, elections were held for the Ruthenan Provincial Autonomous Parliament.

After the failure of the talks between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Vienna Award decided Hungary's territorial claims and, as a result, the CSR (Czechoslovak

Republic) was forced to cede 1,725 km<sup>2</sup> of Subcarpathian Ruthenan territory, with a population of 173,000, to Hungary on 2 November 1938. Following these territorial changes, the size of Subcarpathian Ruthenia decreased to 11,094 km<sup>2</sup> and the population dropped to 552,000. The secession of this territory was a great loss for Subcarpathian Ruthenia, because it was made up of fertile plains, the railway connection with Slovakia passed through it, the capital city of Uzgorod as well as the largest city, Mukachevo, were located there. The autonomous government moved to L'vov.

After Slovakia broke away and the other Czech countries were occupied by Nazi Germans, the Provincial Autonomous Parliament in L'vov passed a resolution on 11 March 1939 declaring Subcarpathian Ruthenia to be an independent state called Carpatho-Ukraine. Shortly after this, on 16 March 1939 the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine began and after two days of fighting with the Home Guard and the remnants of the Czechoslovak army, it was annexed by Hungary as an autonomous territory called Carpathia.

#### **Annexation by the Soviet Union**

At the end of World War II, the superpowers were not only fighting a common enemy but also increasingly fighting for the future structure of postwar Europe. The Soviet Union's interest in the political and power status of Central Europe was projected into its activities in relation to Subcarpathian Ruthenia, whose territory would enable Stalin's USSR to have strategically important access to the Carpathian basin. In October 1944 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was liberated from the Hungarian by the Soviet Army, but the Horthy occupation was merely replaced by Soviet occupation. Many interests were interwoven in this region—those of the Soviet political leadership, the Red Army, security, the Ukrainian government, local functionaries, the masses, as well as of the Czechoslovak Government representatives. In October 1944 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was divided into two zones. The developed, southly established, central and western portions were destined to be the Soviet army's theater of operations, although they could not de facto be so since the front was located 40 kilometers to the west of the country's borders at the time. No official Czechoslovak representatives were permitted to enter this zone, and no Czechoslovak agencies were permitted to be established there. On the other hand, full freedom was given to local communists and their activists who organized so-called national committees. The southeastern, very backward, mountainous region of Subcarpathian Ruthenia remained under Czechoslovak administration. In November 1944 the First Congress of National Committees met in Mukachevo under the supervision of the NKVD and it passed a manifesto that directed the executive organ of power i.e. the National Council to reunite Transcarpathian Ukraine with its great mother, the Soviet Ukraine. This proclaimed reunification with the Ukraine was not justified historically since Subcarpathian Ruthenia and the

Ukraine had never been ousted in the past. The advocates of the union easily controlled the political life of the region because they had all the tools of power at their hands as well as the support of the Red Army. They did not allow the opponents of the union to voice an opinion, and they forced the Czechoslovak representatives, i.e., the Czechoslovak military mission and representatives of the Czechoslovak administration, to leave the occupied territory. Under these conditions, the Czechoslovak Government and the president were deprived of the possibility to implement their power in the occupied territory and thus prevent the unfettered annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Ukrainian SSR—and the local population was never asked what it wanted.

Under the coercion of the Soviet Union and counter to the CSR constitution, an agreement was signed between the USSR and CSR in Moscow on 29 June 1945 about handing Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR, that is, to the Ukrainian SSR. On the insistence of Moscow, it was hastily ratified by the provisional CSR National Assembly on 22 November 1945, although the resolution of constitutional matters, which include changes in borders, did not fall under its jurisdiction. The agreement went into force on 10 January 1946.

The subsection of the above-mentioned agreement states that this was done according to the wishes of the people of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. In fact, all this occurred without the participation of their true representatives and merely on the basis of the manipulated Mukachevo Congress of National Committees. The agreement also defined new borders between the CSR and USSR because of an important railroad station in the east Slovak town of Čop, thus Czechoslovakia lost additional Slovak territory with 13 communities including Čop, an area of 141 km<sup>2</sup>, and more than 10,000 inhabitants. As a result of this shift in the border, the CSR had to build a new railroad station in Cierna nad Tisou. Subcarpathian Ruthenia was then integrated into the Soviet Ukraine as the Transcarpathian oblast in January 1946 through a decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

After 1945 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was subjected to a period of arrests involving clergymen, teachers, intellectuals, members of former political parties, and students as well as a period of extraordinary, so-called people's trials. About 25,000 citizens were deported to Siberia and all civic democratic organizations were abolished.

#### Data

Subcarpathian Ruthenia encompasses an area of 12,800 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population of 1.25 million, 76 percent Ruthenes, 14 percent Hungarians, 4 percent Russians, 2.4 percent Romanians, 0.7 percent Slovaks, and 0.3 percent Germans. At this time, outside the territory of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, about 700,000 Ruthenes live in the United States, and an additional 200,000 in Canada. The administrative center of the region is Užgorod.

The following industries have been developed in the region: wine making, canning, meat industry, machine industry, timber and wood working industry, shoe industry and the textile industry. Vines, fruit, cereals, potatoes, tobacco and sunflowers are cultivated in the region. Beef cattle raising and sheep breeding have been developed.

#### Philosopher Looks at Czech-Slovak Relations

Dr. Jiříček Brzobohatý, KLETFRNÝ ZEVÍČEK, in Slovenský časopis, 42 p. 1

[Interview with Professor Erasmus Kukla, Boston University and Charles University; tv Sema cultural, place and date not given. "Let Us Free Ourselves From the Anger"]

[Text] Erasmus Kukla, born 1915, is one of those about whom so-called practical people would shake their heads in incomprehension. As a 13-year-old boy, he went into exile with his parents. He completed his studies in philosophy at Yale University and made himself a worldwide reputation based partly on his many years of activities in the field and partly on literary works, among others his successful ecological study "The Embers and the Stars." After the events of November [1989] he returned to Prague, reduced his obligation to the Boston university to a minimum, and is lecturing most of the school year at Charles University so that he can contribute to the renewal of our homeland. He has an personal relationship to Slovakia, but he can best tell of this himself.

[Cechová] Recently it was the 7th of March, the birthday of President Masaryk, something about which no person of good will in Czechoslovakia can be indifferent. Even people of less good will are not indifferent. After 40 years of discrimination against Masaryk, it is in fact a paradox.

[Kukla] I think that the doubts about Masaryk actually do not concern him as a person, but rather all the undesirable weaknesses of the First Republic. Only the First Republic was not what Masaryk had in mind. It just happened to him. When we read over, for example, the records of the Imperial Council which include Masaryk's speeches, we see that Masaryk was not against Austria, but always stood against any kind of advantages that one nationality took of another. He stood for a state which as much as possible would support the growth of all its citizens, of all the peoples and nationalities, to full development of their human nature. He did not want to destroy Austria, but rather to destroy injustice, intolerance, and opposition to democracy, in a word, to destroy totalitarianism. This is what he was concerned about. He assumed that we would be living in a multinational state. He had no illusions that nations or our were located at the crossroads of Europe could actually be self-sufficient. He counted on cooperation within the framework of Austria. When Austria later fell under Berlin's influence and into that tragic war, it was clear that if it won the war, Austria would become an offshoot of the

(Upper German) movement and if it lost the war our individual nations would be thrown upon the mercy of the existing strong national units. The Czechs on the mercy of the Germans and Slovaks on that of Hungarians. Even at that time it was clear to Masaryk that if our nation were to develop any further we would have to find a replacement for Austria.

[Kuchta] Do you think that there is some kind of analogy here with today's tendency to create national states?

[Kuchta] I think that is very clear. Any time that a people loses its cultural consciousness, it looks for support and a crust of nationalism. I know that very much applied to us Czechs. Always, when we were not sure of ourselves, we have turned to this position, but of course it did not lead to any solution to the problems. For example, the tragically short-lived Czech party rejected participation in the Austrian parliament in the so-called Imperial Council. For 17 years, when we needed to be building up education and the economy, developing our nation, we missed power twice. Czech Czech politicians of that time said that the less we went to the Imperial Council, the stronger we would be. And this was a great mistake. Masaryk's realism is based on just this idea that by recommending proceeding in a practical and realistic way instead of theoretically by saying that we reject participation in the Imperial Council on the basis of national rights. By participating in the Imperial Council we can serve ourselves by transforming the semi-Austrian state in which we will be able to live and we will build up the basis for culture. Masaryk was probably after a second Czech university in Brno. But he also many times came to the defense of the Slovaks people against the Hungarians, which at that time Vienna was very unhappy to hear because the Hungarian Kingdom did not belong within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Council after the Austro-Hungarian settlement of 1867. At that time Masaryk was not concerned with building a Czech state but rather with a good and just state, neither Czech nor German, a state for all nations and a state in which no nation—not Germans, nor Hungarians, nor Czechs—was superior, the one in which the rule of justice was supreme.

[Kuchta] In Masaryk anticipated something like this.

[Kuchta] If Masaryk had been born in 1918 and if he had developed in the same way through his philosophical and life experiences, I am convinced that today he would not be a supporter of Czechoslovakism. After all, his entire career he emphasized respect for the unique nature of all peoples. In 1918 it was definitely necessary to create from nothing a state which would protect the Slovaks and Czechs. I think that even at that time Czechoslovakia was a miracle, but I understand that it could have appeared to be the only path to accomplish the goal. But even at that time Masaryk was going against his lifelong approach to questions of nationalism. It is possible that today he would think that we spend too much time on the questions of the state legal arrangements and too little

time on questions of education, that is, on that of building the state and too little on building the nation.

[Kuchta] In your opinion, what must be done and about the problem of centralization rather Prague orientation?

[Kuchta] One can too fight against Prague orientation in Prague. There one has the opportunity in all else or such a formula, although one which is somewhat very important, as moving the capital city of the administration from Prague in the Czech lands to somewhere on the border between Slovakia and the Czech lands. The majority of the countries that have our problems have resolved it by building the capital in enough communities, for example, Washington. For the moment, however, we cannot allow this. Now it is a matter of clearly pointing out that Prague orientation is a problem. However, it is not enough just to react to the problem by stamping our feet and getting angry. This will only cause confusion and will not change the situation.

[Kuchta] There have also been proposals, and no easily without any basis, that the seat of the parliament should be Prague and the seat of the Federal Government should be Bratislava.

[Kuchta] I think that is a very good proposal. It is of absolute no importance whether we will have the congress of deputies in Prague or not. With the current level of technology, it does not matter if the assembly is in Bratislava or on Maša Štefan Street. The communication is in any case via electrons; and the idea that the Federal Government would be based in Bratislava appears to be a very positive one.

[Kuchta] In Slovakia I also heard the very important that good Czech-Slovak relations will not be achieved by building two independent entities. As you say, one can too fight for the rights of the Slovaks in Prague itself. A lot of blame is placed on the Czech representatives for always putting a majority of Czechs in the best locations in the diplomatic service, especially during the First Republic, and in the crucial negotiations that the Slovaks have had their own representatives in the three most important embassies: Berlin in Washington, Geneva in London and finally in Paris.

[Kuchta] And after 1945, Pospisil was assigned to the United Nations Organization and he was also a Slovak. The problem arose in part after the war because many of the Czechoslovak diplomatic representatives at that time had given over to the service of the Slovak state and the restored Czechoslovak Republic, except for myself in the diplomatic service these people who had represented all of Hitler. I do not think, however, that there was any intention to do unfairly, but even if there had been, it is now necessary to end it once and for all since the basis for a truly Czech-Slovak state.

[Kuchta] You have said that after a certain measure to the extent, the people and the individual lose for their identity in some kind of greater aggressive act. Our

program hasn't been done already for quite a long time. Two neighboring regions, one after the other with a brief pause from 1945 to 1948. Each one by its own expression of separation of Central Europe is definitely a consequence of the loss of cultural identity?

(Kuchera) I unfortunately had a **long-standing** conversation with Krushchev about Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia could have been a fully recognized player in the new game of Europe but because Gruzen, Dubcek, and Milosovitch as individual members **should** provide a framework of change after the war also changing with that, but much more successfully we are faced with stagnation and we do not succeed in concrete measures as we have seen in Yugoslavia.

(Kuchera) It has already been said more than once already that we still want to emphasize the past in contrast to Yugoslavia. There has not been a single day of fraternal blood spill between the Slovaks and the Czechs.

(Kuchera) Let us hope that it stays that way. But it's important that way because we are divided nations and we have a tradition of working together. For God's sake where would the Czechs be today if Slovaks had not preserved the Czech language for them?

(Lederer) That is the first time that I have ever heard the Slovaks preserved the Czech language?

(Kuchera) You preserved it for us at the Auschitz Hitler and the borders of our country—there is now Paisacki participation who grew up in Bratislava—when they returned to the Czech lands found that they had forgotten how to speak Czech there. Salava, Dukorovych—these were all people influenced by the Slovak culture. After all, Slovakia at the beginning of the 19th century was a sort of nation where several cultural influences intertwined. Prague was the home to the Paisacki and Masekis but concentrated on this after their arrival in Prague. The tradition of mutual cooperation is also indisputable and we are also close especially. We can talk there to the other the importance of competing in Europe, but we also open up new horizons for each other culturally. The Czechs have new horizons opened up for them when they read, let us say, SLOVENSKÉ PRÍBĚHY which we consider from the best magister of its type in the Federal Republic. So we have mutual recognition, cultural recognition, and the function of the achievement of Europe. After that reason it will be indispensable for us to get into the European as a unit capable of competing and not as fragmented pieces.

(Kuchera) In a word, the best option for Slovaks is an equal, strong federation which Czech-Slovaks can in fact be in the western part of Central Europe and we can hope that it might moreover be a model of a reasonably solution to others for all of postcommunist Europe.

(Kuchera) You imagined, if we are able to free ourselves from anger. It makes no difference whether it is justified anger. For 40 years we have really accumulated

enough offense, bitterness, and justified reasons for anger but when we are out of anger then we are in danger too. When I come home from work and sleep after 12 hours on my feet and I used to catch up on reading and listening rights no telephone when times, I have even right to sit up off the wall. I have the right because to this I eliminated the fact that I cannot make any telephone calls. Yes, the Czechs have eliminated the Slovaks in many ways and I understand the justification for the Slovaks because of the Czechs.

(Kuchera) Hatred is never justified. No anger is justified.

(Kuchera) Even if that anger is justified, it still does not justify any change for Slovaks, but certainly not of that brutal strength. What we need to be concerned about today is the need to learn to know each other, for so we are not willing to treat each other as. The basis of democratic discussion is always that the first step is to try to understand the other's position and to tend it back. In other words, I do not agree, I will not have it, but I know how to negotiate with it. That is the first requirement, for us to understand who and how a person looks at things, because a discussion begins with learning and there is far too little of that here. We either do not want at all, angry, wanting for the other person to do it so that we can put forth our views, or we listen to the other side only so that we can find arguments against them. We do not listen so that we can understand someone. Secondly, we then need to have good will. To listen things through, not to prove your own position no matter what it costs, that is look for a compromise solution which would represent the maximum understanding of the partner's justified hopes and demands, as well as their differences. It will not be one hundred percent for others, but after all it is very important that we be generous and broadminded with ourselves. Generosity has been lost here, but after all we do not have to paid for everything to which we have a right. Summarize we can say, "Well, I must get them out of this, but I will not because I am capable of governing." I look at the Czech attitude toward Slovaks. This great antagonism is based on this I do not mean the Czech oligarchs who are not the kind of people but the mass of Czechs of a Czechoslovak oligarchism. They were their own kind of Czech-Slovaks. Nevertheless, if we want to build a Czech-Slovak state, the first thing that I have to feel for as a Czech is what the Slovaks are concerned with, for what I am concerned with. I think that we are not willing to listen, that there is not enough good will, and that there is a desperate lack of government.

(Kuchera) Let us get back to the present, your article "Living on the Right Foot" elicited an interest in the Slovak cultural community in discussions, as well as polemics. We performed for example the article by Petr Zajicek "On What Is Slovaks Living?" How did you react to that?

(Kuchera) The author wrote very precisely and I am always glad to see the subject begin to develop. Of course, for a country right. In the article, I speak of the

central cultural movement and central figures of Prague-Prague and České Budějovice. But the former situation is different and the author with present-day consciousness that what is put out as the left wing of Slovakia is the others of transnationalists, had to disassociate it with a short final sentence: "Slovakia is largely living on the Devil's head of postmodernism." That is a truth. I am a leftist mainly because I do not consider transnationalism as the left or the right. I do not know how to determine whether national transnational during the war was then "national" or then "transnational." I do not know how to determine whether the KSČ is a national Party of Slovakia, was of the left or the right persuasion, or had features of both. It was a transnational party. I think that the concepts of left and right can be used meaningfully only within the framework of a democratic system. Per Zápis a society right. It is too right to use the concepts of the left to assess the measures of the neopopulist regime. It is better to speak about social responsibility. I am concerned that we do not live along on a lack of social responsibility. And when I speak of the insincerity of the left, I should speak more precisely about the lack of social responsibility.

**Electing**) The concept of the left and the right has over time become thoroughly mixed up. The leaders of the so-called "right-wing associations" in what way were they right-wing? After all, those who had the power at the end and who would not be allowed to anything had obviously nothing to connect with the so-called left-wing.

**Roman**) According to the traditional meaning of the left, it is those people who were Change and the right is those who want to maintain the status quo. And I therefore think that the communists' party was definitely a right-wing power. In the article "Category of the Right Power" I wanted to demonstrate that this country lacks a West-type social democratic party. We do not have a party that would take care of social responsibility. This is what I was concerned about. Even in Slovakia, as far there is no genuine force which would commit itself to social responsibility. And I do not think that the communists will do that since they are committed to their own power.

**Electing**) Steiner says that after the new social antibiotics could lead to the development about which you are speaking. Alexander Dubcek in his programme proposed a development in the movement by those members which we can rightly consider to be left-wing power. But one thing is clear: as long as our politicians think in terms of a transnational philosophy, there cannot be any reason for the citizens to leave the structure.

### Slovak Parliament Approves Public Interest Law

APPS-438-40-461  
26 May 1982

*(Article by Jozef Šimonek, Jozef Černák, and František Melich: "The Development of Government: Was Your Approved?"*

**Electing**) Jozef Šimonek: Minister Šimonek of the Interior, I have a letter to discuss on behalf of a group of citizens the promulgation of a Slovak National Council (SNK) law on urban development and land protection for public interests. The law entered force on 1st July 1981 as an amendment. This is an important law of citizens. It amends the conditions for protecting the public interests and citizens of SNK regions. Slovak Government ministers, vice-ministers and staff of the Slovak Government Office, the SNK Office and Central Building Committee in Bratislava emphasized the importance of the law. Eduard Boček (Part of the Democratic Left (SKL)) said that the submitted draft civil action on regional laws is good. And for Minister Miroslav Rataj (Environment) stated that the regulation should also be introduced for districts as they had addressed them for citizens. Roman Hrdlička (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS)) responded to report that the law was not adopted at the beginning of the previous period. This would have prevented the formation of Socialist-Liberal Union (SĽUP). But Ján Belinský (Socialist National Party (SNS)) suggested that public offices cannot limit the law interests even if the supplementary proposal was adopted by the deputies. The law was approved in a session after the usual three (three) rounds.

### Voting on the Declaration

SNK discussion on groupings and individuals. There depends on our being in or not. The following is a summary of the voting on the draft declaration of Slovak citizenship according to the individual lists:

**SKS**—all 21 members voted against the proposal.

**Christian Democratic Movement (KDU)**—of the 21 members, 11 voted against. One abstained and two were not present.

**Socialist Party**—of the five members, four voted against and one did not vote.

**Hungarian Civic Party**—of the five members, four voted against and one was not present.

**SNS**—of the 17 members, 10 voted in favor and seven were not present.

**MDS**—of the 21 members, 14 voted in favor and seven were not present.

**SĽUP**—of the 21 members, 10 voted in favor. Three voted against, and one abstained.

**Progressive SLD**—of eight members, none voted against.

**Slovak People's Party**—of the six members, two voted in favor and one voted against.

**Slovak Liberal Party**—of the four members, two voted in favor and one voted against.

Individuals—was voted in Vienna after much opposition and was not present.

### Czech Parliament Approves Laws on NGOs

at 1981-1982 Prague EDITIONS SURVEY  
in Czech 9 May 82 p. 1

EFTA report "New State, New Citizens"

Vienna, Prague.—The Czech National Council approved yesterday the laws on NGOs and their activities, on state-enterprise registration, and on landowners and registered aliens.

The newest order which will come into effect on 1 January reinforces the position of NGOs and the subject of their activity in the context of the privatization of the state-owned offices. It also regulates the organization and position of the National Chamber. The law reserves incomes from all documentation, it will be transferred to the state bodies—courts, financial offices and registers. Another two addendum bills are in preparation for a further entitlement of non-state registered aliens. The same measure would introduce privatization by being changed to the Czech Republic non-state registered aliens (CR), and the private owners are required to register registrars. The law clarifies the requirements of contracts on transfer of state assets conducted by managers, and regulate the agenda in the state-enterprise. They will also assume the records from the land registers. The Czech Land Survey and Register Office is established as the central body for the state administration of property and cataloguing. The expense, grants, and cataloguing-administrations are abolished, as are the land-enterprise agency and immovable registries.

The Czech National Council debate with S. Bureš, Federal Security Information Service director, on the unmasking of informants did not take place yesterday. The Federal Security Information Service director did not appear.

### Czech Parliament Approves New Tax System

at 1981-1982 Prague EDITIONS SURVEY  
in Czech 9 May 82 p. 1

Report on "W" "The Way Toward Economic Change"

Vienna: "To alleviate the burden on taxpayers within the framework of federal and Czech legislation laws to be introduced," said Czech Foreign Minister Karel Svoboda at the PRAGUE ALBANY SUMMIT following the approval of the Czech Republic's new taxation system at yesterday's Non-Czech National Council (NCC) session. According to him, overall tax revenue will converge roughly to what is currently being collected.

First of all, the session approved a road tax that includes vehicle registration used for business purposes. It

replaces a previous one imposed by former decrees to an 11,000 crowns per annum; all other vehicles if they are not registered with a chassis number before 1 January 1982. Taxes rates for private car usage from 1,200 to 1,600 crowns and are calculated according to the size of the registered motorist. The rates for trucks, trailers, trailers and buses range from 1,000 to 16,000 crowns depending on the number and weight of their axes. The trucker will file now a road fund and will be used in construction and transport roads. Estimated annual amount is approximately 4 billion crowns per annum and some 10 million drivers lacking at this time an average road surface utilization (motorists could suffer from non-financial traffic).

Other taxes—dwell house, gift tax, and property transfer are—impose the current taxation law, which means a return to the principles of the years 1923-57. These taxes have differentials making rates according to the size of the property concerned. Following a proposal from the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, it was decided that for a period of ten years from the time enactment and transfer of personal property and real estate a tax corresponding to the taxes applicable as of 1 December will be levied—it is calculated with specific requirements. It is theory advantageous for the taxpayer. The same tax property transfer made in connection with residence and not by husband or wife or son.

Classification into three groups concerning the taxation stage is stipulated for calculating the tax. For example persons belonging to the first group, without living in the second group, and other persons belong to the third group. The lower income a person has and the higher the tax of the property. The higher the income the persons property used for personal purposes and tax charged for business is lowered from about 20% and gift tax if the value of the property does not exceed 100,000 crowns for people in the first group, 100,000 crowns for people in the second group, and 270,000 for people in the third group. Otherwise the tax is payable within 6 days of the decision on the amounts being taxed.

The introduction to the law on legal fees and fees for contracts from the individual sector has recognized that in business certain legal fees are payable within three days of their submission. If that sum has not been paid by that deadline, it is payable in full afterwards up to 1,000 crowns on each contract.

The law on advertising—or fees—the aim of which is to fix charges for certain operations connected with the state administration, is also being revised or maintaining rates of tariff as in approach. For example, consulting the business register and records will cost 20 crowns. Consulting business files of national banks will cost 10 crowns. A business document—100 crowns, a letter—100 crowns and a business permit—100 crowns.

The law on administrative fees and fees for other services of specific rights and obligations of landowners and financial offices. It significantly increases administrative measures

against tax evasion attempts and in particular, fines—amounts for not keeping proper records. A fine of up to 2 million korunas can be imposed for repeated serious shortcomings of this kind.

The 1992 CNSB session began in the afternoon. The deputies did not include on its agenda a proposal from the Civic Democratic Party Club to adopt a resolution on Protection Security and Information Services reform and on dealing with them.

By amending the Czech laws on oilseed and large-scale privatization the CNSB decided to increase community budgets by 1.2 billion korunas from the revenue from small-scale privatization. So far this amount amounts 2.2 billion korunas. The money is intended for three commissioners that for small businesses and other aspects of control of the privatization process. It will also be possible to obtain money from the National Property Fund to pay for the costs associated with evaluating the ecological damage caused by entrepreneurial activity. It is possible to transfer property from the Fund either to foundations.

A draft law on the establishment, status and operation of Czech Republic business and agricultural Chambers was also on the agenda. The deputies propose proposals from oligarchs' membership and evaluating the chambers from below. According to the proposal, district chambers in the regions that change and special districts and urban centers could become associations on the basis of their own decisions.

The law affecting 2 million entrepreneurial entities was approved and an Economic Chamber based in Prague will come into operation on 1 July 1992 and an Agricultural Chamber based in Brno will come into operation on 1 January 1993. The chambers should give advice and provide information services, cooperate with other bodies in trying to research staff and money management, share an interest in the professional standard of business, issue—according to specific regulations—certificates and expert proofs of view and so on. The chamber's supreme organ is its assembly of delegates.

The CNSB recommended the Czech government to derive a regulation according to deal with the members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CSOPI). The Federal Assembly President should adopt a law or legal measure to abolish—at particular—the mechanism on the CSOPI's economic contacts with foreign countries. The CSOPI should cease to exist on the day the joint body involving the Czech Economic Chamber and the Slovak Chamber of Industry and Commerce is established. It was proposed that CSOPI property be donated on a 2:1 ratio of Czech Republic to Slovakia.

The Czech parliament also adopted an amendment to a 1975 government regulation on waste management charges. The basic charge for waste disposal will be drafted in law. During the course of the day a draft

law—drafted by the CNSB government—was publishing a list of demands citizens had in the region of former State Security (StB) files was submitted to the CNSB. The CNSB Plenary Board and state held meetings during the evening to discuss it.

Following the Plenary Board's meeting, CNSB Chairman Dagmar Beranova (CDA) said journalists that she had personally proposed an amendment to Paragraph 18 of the Scrutinizing Law so that senior StB officers and their representatives at the Commission of Communists who supervised the StB in the departments dealing with the struggle against the enemy could not be protected by the law on publication. According to her the CNSB Club in the CNSB is opposed to secret publication without giving individual consideration to every person involved. This was confirmed by CNSB Club Chairman Martin Beran. "We do not want to catch the small fish but the main party partners," he emphasized.

CNSB Deputy Chairman Jan Kavvada (Civil Democratic Alliance (EDA)) described the government draft as "very flawed." The EDA is in favor of codifying the principles for public information about public property. "Do not consider the fact that every citizen will be entitled to be important for society's future existence," added the EDA chairman.

#### Slovak Parliament Approves New Taxation Law

EDENR/16,172 Bratislava, PR of Slovakia  
in Slovac 1 May 92 pp 1-1

[Report by Antonina Vranačová and Ivan Barta, "The Level of Responsibility Is Different"]

Executive Briefing—The 14th Slovak National Council (SNC) session convened yesterday following the May Day holiday weekend. The 500-day began with a Plenum session. It made a decision on the course of action to be pursued in defining the powers on parliament's agenda. At the start of proceedings the plenum commemorated the 70th anniversary of the tragic death of Milan Rastislav Štefánik.

The deputies then put the finishing touches on the government SNC bill—“left over” from Thursday (27 April)—on death duty, gift tax, and property transfer. Following a debate involving 67 deputies, 59 voted in favor of the law. The law replaces the current taxation from inheritance, gifts, and property transfer. It maintains the tax classification under the acquisition of property by inheritance or by gift as required. To facilitate calculation of death duty, gift tax, and property transfer tax, people are categorized into three groups according to the extent of their relationship or other personal attachment to the person gifting or receiving property. Overall revenue from cultural fees of 1991 amounted to 104.1 million korunas. According to Paragraph 17 of the law, personal property for the general law of individual persons but utilized for business or other profitmaking purposes is exempt from

death duty and gift tax. The value of the property does not exceed Kč 10,000; inheritance for the first tax paying group is Kč 100,000; inheritance for the second tax paying group is Kč 200,000; inheritance for the third tax paying group is Kč 300,000. Other amounts exceeding the aforementioned sums will be taxed. (The taxes are the same as in the Czech Republic.)

Following the law's approval, Prime Minister Jan F. Langaguek (Czechoslovak Democratic Movement) presented a report on the fulfillment of the Social government's Policy Statement. He said that the report assesses the government's activities during the 1991-92 transitional period—the period that followed the first free and democratic elections. The president has called the government elected in these elections the government of national unity. Langaguek described the expression as appropriate and in the past. He said that the fundamental problem encountered in transforming our society—which this government highlighted as its primary goal—is its incapacity and wide-ranging nature. It was necessary to prepare and implement extensive, far-reaching transformations of the planned economic system into an economy based on market principles. Working out the preconditions for revitalizing society, especially in the industrialization system, was a no less demanding and important task. He also mentioned the foreign and domestic conditions under which transformation took place. (page 5 omitted)

Peter Vorec (Part of the Democratic Left) delivered a meaningful speech in which he outlined warning points aimed at preventing the recession and at launching economic development and restructuring the economy. He emphasized the following: "After this two-year period, that is, I have to say that the political participation following the formation of the new government and the government's inability to fulfill its policy statements are responsible for the current social and economic situation. It is a responsibility for representatives of the government, partners and supporters in power of the power for our preference of the approach in cooperation with whom they will be negotiate."

"We do not agree with implementing such massive increases in an anti-inflation tax for the transition to a market economy. First and foremost, the results of the government's economic policy are to blame for this."

The government has not addressed the fundamental aim of its economic policy—restoring decline and improving the economy in 1992—and there are no signs that this will be achieved by the end of the year. Economic results for the first four quarters of 1992, compared to the same period last year—this is where the industrial output has declined by 4.5 percent (the figure in the Czech Republic, production of labor has declined by 11.5 percent, 7.8 percent, industrial output has fallen by 50.5 percent, 23.4 percent), exports have declined by 1.5 percent (they increased by 7.0 percent in the Czech Republic), and average wages have increased by only 0.1 percent, while they increased by 2.1 percent in the Czech Republic. The government has the presumption to

make an attempt to do something positive following the controversial budget issued in November." (page 5 omitted)

### Economic Transition Prospects to 1993

KČ 600-650/4 Prager Ekonomicke vydavatelstvi  
6 Apr 93 pp 16-17

[ABSTRACT: Dr. Zdenek Švec, Associate of Economic Policy College of Economics, "To Look for a Partnership as Early as This Year"—the paragraph is EKA and the introduction]

[CONTINUATION] Some representatives of the institutions [in the] last already several times postponed the issuance of forecasts when the economic decline is projected as rapid in "between" and begins to slow in the "above-average". First, they pushed the date forward to 1992, then in the first half of that year and gradually toward the end of that year or the beginning of the new year. However, this was more an expression of faith in a continuation without expectation and participation.

Toward the end of January 1992, however, the ministry EKA/UNIC/Ed. No. 4 presented a study to the Chairman of the Federal Statistical Office, Eng. Ivan Nejedlý, in which it spoke of an attempt by this institution in collaboration with the Brno-based DPK/PST/T organization, to work out an actual program showing the development of basic macroeconomic indicators for the year 1992 with projections for 1993. The intention is the use of a "new short-term model of the Czechoslovak economy for the transition period" and attempts to quantification by combining economic measures derived from quarterly survey figures of the České statistické úřad [with information obtained from the models of several West European countries] indicate that the so-called "partnership based on making the sea level" has a serious attempt based on a scientific methodological approach.

The forecast, which is worked out in four variations, ranging from the optimistic to a significantly pessimistic and the latter confirming the unfavorable development of internal and external conditions, agrees on one fact in all four cases: the economy will begin to turn around from the bottom it has reached (the lowest level of the gross national product is early in the first two quarters of this year). From that point on, all four variations—including the most pessimistic one, which extends this time period to the end of the third quarter of 1993)—are showing a strong trend which is strengthened for a short time (i.e., at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993) even though the growth rates shown differ.

A little later toward the end of 1992, in addition to the development of the GNP, in the continuation of anti-inflationary efforts, during that latter period of 1992-1993 to 1993-1994, as well as in the development of inflation, when consumer prices are expected to surpass the level of December 1992 by 7% to 8%

### What Did Last Year's Developments Show?

The key question with respect to the outcome of the forecast is whether and to what extent it is able to legitimate and quantify precisely those factors which are decisive for the period under consideration. In consolidated market conditions, these are factors which are decisively weaker from the medium standpoint, as long as we do not encounter a more extreme influence being exercised by exogenous extraneous factors. Consequently, forecasting here is relatively more reliable and the propagation of new factors from the previous period has a certain stabilizing capability with respect to the expectation of future development.

However, for an economy which is transforming itself, forecasting is highly problematical if not actually misleading, particularly in the first phase. These factors which determined the development of the GNP and other macroeconomic aggregates last year in the CSEB will be significantly different this year.

The determining factors for the level and pace of the gross national product in 1991 were the liberalization of prices and the rates of exchange (internal external coordination), as well as the liberalization of markets in the former socialist countries. The cumulative effect was a substantial reduction of aggregate demand and a general derivation of money—both of cash and idle savings. And this occurred both in the sector of households, in the enterprise system, and also in the state budget, where the purchasing power of expenditures declined by at least one-third although these expenditures remained at their nominal levels.

The enterprise system, which, for the most part, continues to be implemented by uncoordinated and therefore thoroughly uncoordinated state enterprises, adopted only partially its intended production, employment levels through a did nothing with regard to overemployment as well as investments. These factors were, for the most part, exhausted during the course of the year. A new factor formed in the economy at a substantially lower level than the potential level of the GNP. The drag on the GNP by roughly 15 percent does not characterize this derivation of real production from potential production with sufficient accuracy, because it comprises annual averages which conceal developmental trends which occurred within the turnaround year. Consequently, data on the development of industrial and overall construction activity, which is obtained on a monthly basis, is closer to reality. In December 1991, the decline according to preliminary data provided by the Federal Statistical Office amounted to 16.3 percent compared to the same period of the previous year for industrial production, and 14.2 percent for construction activity.

### This Year, Different Factors Will Be Decisive

The actual factors, in the extent to which it has already been realized, is somewhat lower at the beginning of 1992 than it would seem based on GNP developmental data. All that certain factors will impact by its further

development on the basis of last year's determining factors, continue to exist. The continuing disengagement of export markets and the inadequate effects of the suggestion to compensate for the "effects of the Amstergrain" upon the aggregate demand of export enterprises with respect to Western markets remains the principal risk factor.

The factors which will have a decisive influence upon the movement of the GNP in 1992 will be substantially different from the ones of last year and the prognosis of their effects is connected with a still greater measure of uncertainty than was the case regarding the liberalization of prices and exchange rates at the first year of transformation. These are predominantly exogenous factors—external factors from the standpoint of the usual mechanism of economic functioning, but, in all cases, they have far-reaching consequences with regard to the movement of the gross national product. They particularly include the following: large-scale privatization, with the predominance of foreign privatization, the results of the elections upon the orientation and adoption of the new government, the realistic results of the state budget, and—last, but not least—the development of expectations by the population and by the management of newly forming entities in the business sphere, regarding the future developments of the economy.

The year 1992 is the year of major privatization, in which, in two waves, one-half of the business associations state-owned facilities is to find its specific and fully responsible owners. A substantial portion of enterprises will, at the course of the year, be defined in terms of capital, including the possibility for movement of this capital through a capital market. This market will generate a virtual minimum of millions of so-called of the privatized enterprises are added to the current three waves of bond issues, virtually overnight.

How will this trend of it turn out? It is difficult to predict the actual economic process. The definition of the GNP. Potentially, it creates both positive and also negative elements. On the positive side, the decision may be the suggestion that, starting next year, private entities will change the conduct of enterprises in a cardinal manner, and will substantially stimulate them at a different reading to progress. Even if we were to admit the full nature of this suggestion, no realistic application can hardly be regarded as early as 1992. It is far more likely that from the short-range viewpoint, the existing privatization agenda will be replaced for the time being, by federal privatization, given administrative influences on the part of management, striving more to gain a place in the sun rather than to achieve extra-federal production efficiency. And this is an without consideration as to whether the result of new waves of foreign privatizations will be a predominance of registered members of the economy, or notwithstanding other a small number of privatization funds. The new owners will have an influence on this year's pace of production. The positive influence of foreign privatizations—in the extent to which it will

sector—may be reasonably expected only over the longer-term because of several years in the future.

In the short term, it is more likely that the influences will converge at further depress the GNP. And this is no surprise as a result of the "privatization phase" which is spreading over the entire period of 1992, but also—and perhaps, probably because—factors which have hitherto prevented the bankruptcy of enterprises will fail. If the banks did not issue enterprises threatened in this manner by issuing convertible bonds of the Fund of National Projects worth 50 billion korunas [Au.] prior to their privatization, no one will be saving these enterprises after privatization.

The risk that 1992 will not become the year of turnaround, however, is not only based on the new factors operating to restrain the economy. A key question with respect to restoring economic growth involves the extent to which the investment capability of the enterprise sphere, and the related ability to reconstruct, can be assessed in this year. In 1992, the Czechoslovak economy is not confronted with the traditional role of a short-term capitalization policy stemming from functioning market conditions, where the deviation of real production from the potential production (the deflationary or inflationary gap) depending on whether the deviation is downward or upward is solved within the framework of the given production function. In other words, through a greater or lesser utilization of existing capacities and by increasing or reducing employment. If this were the case, it would be worth considering the "application" of some traditional instruments of fiscal and monetary policy to support the growth of aggregate demand. However, such a step would only prick the egos of many enterprises if it were to facilitate a certain growth for them on the basis of existing capacities and technologies. The key to reviving and renewing the growth of the Czechoslovak economy does not lie in stimulating demand, but in initiating structural changes regarding the supply. For the present, the technological and investment image of the supply situation reflects mainly the "significance" of a centrally planned economy. It does not reflect, however, the "sense" of any effective demand, produced as a result of a liberalized domestic market, let alone a foreign market. This is the only way in which multiplying effects can be brought about in aggregate demand without the risk of inflation, be it through maintaining and creating new jobs, increasing exports, etc. However, this is not possible without available capital, without investments.

And here is the first weak spot regarding the performance of coupon privatization in 1992. It does not in and of itself provide new capital. However, no chance lies in the fact that enterprises so privatized attract new capital (otherwise this is more likely to be foreign capital rather than "short-supply" domestic capital). The magnitude of the opportunity cannot be reliably estimated today. Findings regarding privatizations on the currency of the new federal states of United Germany tend to indicate more received rather than overly optimistic expectations

in the short term. What is virtually certain is that respectively, the influence will be felt, at the earliest, during 1993.

Another problem involves the potential creation of new stockholders. The signal emanating from the course of the registration of coupon holders following the entry into the privatization wave of the Plzeňský Pivovar underscored the tendencies of the mass, which the non-covers of coupon privatization were not addressing, even in the face of warnings by numerous critics. The results clearly lie buried on the part of the public, personnel for virtually the entire two-month period set aside for coupon privatization registration. By Christmas, instead of the anticipated two to four million holders of several million coupons, only a little over 500,000 registered. However, in the month of January, which was added, there was an upsurge, with the number of individuals registering exceeding eight million.

And all of this occurred basically because the investment fund (and following its success), there were a number of others playing catch-up and marketing it! Thus an offer to citizens indicating that a deposit of Kčs 1,000 would be worth 70 times that amount in cash a year later. The transformation of coupon privatization from a sterilizing effect into an unpriced "normal" revenue commitment presented two further risks with regard to the fulfillment of its very goals and goals:

The first risk consists of the fact that the majority of citizens do not feel qualified to play the role of a stock exchange investor doing business in the capital market and, therefore, exceed the role in the privatization funds, clearly to those few which are the "most generous."

The second risk lies in the fact that the coupon involved provides the opportunity of transferring investment money (capital) into consumer money, or, in other words, provides the opportunity of living off savings. And this is not only a question of the possibility of investment funds to pay out Kčs 11,000 to Kčs 11,500 in cash after a year for a citizen's coupon holder. The question is what will happen in the securities market if a substantial portion of the popular masses is drawn to the privatization funds, whose "probabilistic" declined some what during the month of January, and deposits their coupons directly with the enterprises involved. This question cannot be easily answered today. Everything depends on the expectations which will prevail in society after a year whether recent developments will give rise to confidence that the economy is turning or, on the other hand, whether there will be fears of a continuing recession and inflation.

In the former case, there is the hope—and in the interest of things nothing other than the fulfillment of this hope can be wished for—that it will prove possible to convince a substantial portion of the newly liquid bondholders not to turn to convert their investment money into consumer money. In the latter case, however, it is virtually

surface that there cannot and be determined by the rule that it is better to have a bird in the hand rather than in the bush. And then some kind of stage of "Mark Fisher" need not be a pattern out of which factors for the Czechoslovak economy. Instead of a capital injection stimulating economic growth, there can be further disorganization of the economy. And this would undoubtedly be an impulse which would accelerate and strengthen the recession far beyond the limits of the year 1992.

### **What Can Short-Term Stabilization Policy Accomplish?**

Even though the central bank has already terminated its harsh restrictive policy in the monetary area, its opportunities—if the economy is not to be exposed to the risk of inflation—are minimal. A more express lowering of the interest rates is, for the time being, not possible as a result of the high interest rates paid on the deposits of the population, which form the foundation for the credit coverage of the commercial banks. The need for liquidity compels the banks to restrict corporate credits (over three-quarters of last year the share of short-term credits rose from 26 to 32 percent). This trend will obviously strengthen in conjunction with privatization, because the opportunity for making direct commercial loans among enterprises who accounted for a substantial portion of so-called resources among state enterprises is reduced as a result of privatization and will be shifted to the system of the commercial banks. Also, a more express lowering of the obligatory reserves (the existing credit limit), as well as the issuance of additional state bonds, can hardly be realized in the present situation without strong inflationary risks.

As far as the state budget is concerned, a budget which even last year failed to perceptively contain any measures for a selective structural policy, it continues in the same direction even this year. Although fiscal policy abandoned the so-called restrictive line which lasted last year anyway when the innovative budget showed a deficit of Kcs 2.3 billion in place of a planned surplus of Kcs 0 billion, it is moving in a balance between revenues and expenditures for this year. The Activities' line of the state budget during economic recession, however, is the realistic assessment of planned revenues. Let us recall last year, when, for example, in January the enterprises in the Czech Lands were showing a profit of Kcs 1.7 billion, in November, however, they were only showing Kcs 1.3 billion in profit. This trend in the development of profits also indicates the limitation of the potential resources to be devoted to investment expansion. Even though the budgets are expecting a certain decline in the GNP, it can hardly be expected that the revenue tax proceeds would provide any kind of new resources to stimulate structural changes in resources which have any hopes of prospering.

That leaves foreign capital. The resulting inflow of capital has not been overly significant for the time being. To assume that no further production capacity expansion and/or positive will undergo some kind of express change particularly in the year of "great privatization activities" would represent exaggerated optimism which would clearly be hard to justify.

If we aggregate all the principal factors which will exert an influence on the level and the dynamics of the gross national product this year we did not have the courage to include the results of the elections or the constitutional arrangements in our calculations, we must truthfully state that only a convergence of three most favorable conditions of development pertaining to all relative factors, which is likely to occur only as an exception, would make it possible for the economy to rebound from the bottom it had reached and to begin returning to the original level in the course of next year. The possible positive influence of the principal factors which influence the level and pace of the GNP for this year is long-range in character. Potentially favorable effects can show up in a more express manner at the earliest during the course of 1994.

### **Updated Outline of Small, Large Privatization**

*4.7.1993/06 Prague DRAFT, MENT of VJ PREZESKU  
in Compt 12 Mar 93 pg 10-14*

[Unpublished report: "The Method of Privatization in Czechoslovakia"]

(Text) Privatization in Czechoslovakia is the simultaneous use of returning property to original owners and their heirs (authorized individuals), the sale of property to foreigners, as well as foreign capital, and a "property gateway" through the means of investment programs. For the present, it is possible to estimate the overall scope of the accomplished privatization only indirectly and very approximately. By using data on growth of the private sector which started in the creation of the gross domestic product to the extent of 6.4 percent by the end of 1991 and in which employment exceeded 10 percent of total employment.

### **Small-Scale Privatization**

The law on small-scale privatization, more precisely Law No. 427/1991 Sb. on transforming the state's ownership of certain assets to other legal entities or physical individuals, was approved on 29 October 1991. It is based on only one privatization method—public auction—and is intended to be used in the privatization of property, the character of which makes it fall under small or medium-size business activities. The regions for the application of the law is particularly the tertiary sector, primarily trade and services, as well as small production programs. The first public auction was held on 26 January 1992.

Number of Operating Units Sold at Auction Under Small-Scale Privatization, Including the Realized Auction Price		
Month	Number of Units Realized Value	Auction Price in Kčs. Value of Assets Realized Value
January	-	-
March	228	58
April	136	91.4
May	2,342	1,021
June	4,745	1,096
July	5,478	1,094
August	8,010	1,288
September	8,014	1,077
October	1,281	1,792
November	12,801	1,038
December	13,236	11,627
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,890</b>	<b>16,369</b>

Thus, over a period of not quite one year since the law on small-scale privatization went into effect, approximately 14,000 operating units have been sold at public auction, with the state realizing roughly Kčs. 1 billion from the proceeds. In approximately 75 out of 100 cases, the auction involved the right to a time-limited rental (at first, for a period of two years, and, after the law was amended, for a period of five years); in the remaining 25 cases, real estate was the subject of the auction and, thus, involved auctioning off ownership rights. The average auction price for an operating unit in small-scale privatization amounted to Kčs. 1 million and, in approximately 60 percent of the cases, was higher than the starting price. A total of 2,130 operating units were sold under terms of a so-called Dutch auction for lower starting prices.

A fundamental problem which small-scale privatization encountered from the very beginning involved the ultimate economic choices of the enterprises being privatized and of their management, which devised very creative ways and methods of defending "their" operating units against privatization by public auction, even of slowing down the process. An unanticipated role in the process of small-scale privatization was played by the other privatization committees which frequently struggled with the enterprises involved for every operating unit.

#### Large-Scale Privatization

The law on large-scale privatization, that is to say, Law No. 40/1991 Sb. on conditions for transforming state

property to other individuals, was approved on 26 February 1991. The fundamental building block of large-scale privatization is the privatization project. The law states that a privatization project is, as a rule, a workflow by the enterprise to be privatized and, then, allows it to be worked out by any private individual or legal entity for any kind of property intended for privatization. Every privatization project must be evaluated by the founder, that is to say, by the appropriate ministry or the local organ of state administration. In the majority of cases, the approval of a privatization project is the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and its Privatization, where the property is to be sold to a previously identified owner and in all cases in which the appropriate government reserves this right unto itself.

The law on large-scale privatization expanded the spectrum of privatization methods, presented each processor with the opportunity of selecting that method which was most advantageous from the standpoint of the business interests. These methods include public auction, public compensation, direct sale to a previously identified owner, transforming the enterprise into a stock corporation which would then make possible seven different ways of acquiring securities, and a low-key transfer of property to communities, to health insurance funds and social security funds, and to banks and savings institutions.

On 15 January 1992, the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and its Privatization of the Czech Republic had been presented with a total of 3,701 privatization projects for approval (including 2,511 basic projects and 1,128 competitive projects).

**Breakdown of Privatization Projects Submitted to the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and its Privatization of the Czech Republic for Approval by 15 January 1992, According to the Proposed Privatization Method**

Proposed Method of Privatization	Number of Projects	In Percent
Public auction	50	11.0
Public compensation	671	18.0
Open sale to a previously identified owner	2,079	55.5
Transformation of enterprise into a stock corporation	1,037	27.5
Privatization of state property based on an existing stock corporation	10	0.3
Low-key transfer of property	461	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,701</b>	<b>100.0</b>

All privatization methods listed in Law No. 40/1991 Sb. are of equal importance in the eyes of the law; the law does not set any priorities in this regard. Furthermore, the few which are understood primarily among the lay public that engage

privatization has a fundamental priority over all other methods does not apply. Nevertheless, coupon privatization will play a key role in the process of complying with the law on large-scale privatization. According to preliminary estimates, this method is to be used to privatize property valued at approximately Kcs 2.6 billion in the Czech Republic and Kcs 0.5 billion in the Slovak Republic. The final number will not be known until the results of the approved privatization projects are in. The deferring of the starting date for coupon privatization from the original January target date to March 1992 gave rise to the most varied conjectures. From the standpoint of safeguarding the offering rule of coupon privatization, the acquisition of guarantees that securities will be issued backed up by real property which has been purged of all reservation claims and has been properly valued, the deferral of coupon privatization was completely inappropriate. Some 8,500 households participated in the bidding for the first wave of coupon privatization (1 November 1991-29 February 1992).

#### Results of Large-Scale Privatizations in 1991

By 31 December 1991, the Fund of National Property of the Czech Republic received 27 approved privatization projects, with six of which have thus far been realized to the full. Five privatization units were auctioned off at public auction although 10 were being auctioned off for a total price of Kcs 74 million, with the starting price amounting to approximately Kcs 20 million. The influence of a new decree on raising land parcels and real estate, which makes some projects virtually unsaleable, turned out to be a negative factor at auction. Two operating units were privatized through public competition at a price which totaled Kcs 1 million. In eight cases, the sale of the state's property participation (seventy-five) was accompanied involving an existing stock corporation and the profits from the proceeds amounted to approximately Kcs 4.6 billion. Four direct sales of property to previously identified buyers were made and totaled Kcs 1.7 million.

### Center Accord Leader Reprimanded by Party Tribunal

011000/92/Russia/NOMY 38147  
to Paris / 1 May 92 p 1

#### (Report to TMR) "A Reprimand for Raczyński"

(Text) The Chief Disciplinary Court of the Center Accord, acting on a motion submitted by a group of Center Accord activists in Krakow and 18 members of the party's Supreme Political Council, has decided to issue a reprimand to Center Accord leader Józef Raczyński for failing to convene a single meeting of the Supreme Political Council over a six-month period last year.

Court President Józef Jacki said that the failure to convene the Supreme Political Council made it impossible for it to approve the list of Center Accord parliamentary candidates in time for the elections. According to the Center Accord statute, only the Council can approve parliamentary candidates.

The court also disagreed the Main Administration's decision to dismiss the Forum of Christian-Democratic Thought (FMDT) as a breach of the party statute. Again, only the Supreme Political Council is entitled to make such a decision, said Jacki. The Council is the Center Accord's highest body, but the Center Accord statute does not deal with these matters in detail.

The court also viewed the Center Accord Parliamentary Club's suspension of four deputies belonging to the FMDT and reprimands issued to three others as a breach of the statute.

"Other charges concerning current party affairs should be, and no doubt will be, examined by the Second Congress of the Center Accord," said Jacki.

Commenting on the court's verdict, Raczyński said: "The matter is a purely political one. The court has been engrossed in a party in the political dispute going on inside the Center Accord. This is very bad. We decided that the court would not decide on these matters because further court cases might cause the Center Accord nothing but harm. It is the Congress' task to examine these matters, and that is why we have brought it up in time."

"I have been reprimanded in only one case in the charge, for not convening the Political Council. In a formal sense, that is a violation of the statute. I will bear the responsibility for this because it is the party chairman's duty to convene this body, even though the decision not to do so was taken by the electoral staff. We were convinced we were acting in the party's interests by not convening the Council."

"Despite everything, I would accept this disciplinary measure were it not for one thing. I am the first person to have been punished by the Disciplinary Court, yet there have been many other episodes earlier which caused far

more damage. That being with Jacki, he ruined the party's interests, yet no-one was punished. I am the first person to be punished in this way. I find this worthless, and not just because I am party chairman. Therefore, I cannot accept the court's ruling, because it is a political move."

"Besides," Raczyński continued, "the manner of presenting the issue is very significant. It was referred to the press. Someone quite simply wanted to create a sensationalist issue of it, and yet this is an internal party matter that should be handled with discretion. Once again someone has shown that he cares nothing for the party's interests. I hope the Congress will judge this in the interests of the Center Accord and Polish democracy. There are parties that act in a democratic way and observe moral principles at the same time. I hope the Congress will reach the appropriate decision."

#### Scenarios for Political Developments Noted

011000/92/Russia/VOX/C/90/97  
to Paris / 1 May 92 p 1

#### 1. next biannual article "Scenario of Tomorrow"

(Text) After the latest Silesian session, a major change in the Polish political situation is likely. There seem to be four possible scenarios likely to come to pass over the next few weeks:

In one of them, which we just describe as a government scenario, the Olszewski cabinet will survive because the Sejm will be too scared to give the president the powers he wants, and the president will withdraw the proposal for the small coalition once the debate on the small constitutional laws. The government gathered around Jan Olszewski have launched a programmatic declaration, and宣言 they say that the government's greatest strength lies in the weakness of its opponents. But the government itself is weakening. Having voted against the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Polish Peasant Party has virtually ceased to be a government ally. The Confederation for an Independent Poland has openly dismissed the government and said it does not want to belong to a United Alliance. In the present nervous atmosphere, the "Christian-National Front" has produced ideas about a government restructuring and reshuffle through the government, and a merger with former Civic matters.

None of this will be much help, I think. The idea of giving the prime ministerial post to a public figure not linked to any political group and thus in principle much more for maneuver. Such a prime minister would be controlled by the political parliamentarianism.

According to a related scenario, the parliamentarian scenario, the small coalition could form a coalition, which would pass a vote of no-confidence in the prime minister and conduct hard talks with the president on the extent of the powers, which could exceed by less than the powers of the Forum President. The small coalition's program might appeal to the parliamentarian rules of the

German Minority Party, Solidarity of Labor, and perhaps the Christian-Democratic Party. Rumors in the corridors of the Sejm suggest that the Polish Peasant Party might also be interested. The Democratic Left Alliance might consider this an opportunity to emerge from its political isolation, so it, too, would be compelled to accept these proposals. However, the parliamentary scenario contains a major fault. There is no sign of any prime ministerial candidate acceptable to all parties.

If the Sejm fails to produce a grand coalition and discharge one of its basic duties, the adoption of a budget, it will be forced to hand over power to the president. That is the point of departure for the next scenario, the small constitution scenario. This scenario calls for two things at the same time: work on a small constitution, which would seriously increase the president's powers, and the Sejm's acceptance of a supraparty government, a government of specialists, which might break the former opposition's reluctance to see anyone not originating from Solidarnosc becoming prime minister.

Finally, there is the April scenario, whereby the president favors not so much the French style of Presidency as the principles of the April 1935 constitution of the Second Republic, which he mentioned with fondness in his Sejm speech last Friday. The strong Presidency advocated by that constitution would antagonize every party in parliament, and everyone would begin to fight everyone else. The parties would fight for the best possible starting position prior to a new, anticipated Sejm election, and the president would fight to create his own political base quickly.

According to what politicians have been saying, it seems as if a scenario somewhere between the parliamentary one and the small constitution one might come to pass. That is good, because it shows that common sense is triumphing.

#### Szczepietiew Discusses Prague Visegrad Summit

AL 1401120002 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
11 May 92 p 1

[Article by "R.C."—"Minister Szczepietiew Talks to POLSKA ZBROJNA"]

[Text] Acting Defense Minister Ryszard Szczepietiew has returned from the Prague working meeting of the defense ministers of the so-called Visegrad three. On his arrival at Warsaw Airport, POLSKA ZBROJNA asked him for an assessment of the meeting from the point of view of Poland's interests.

"I am pleased to say that the defense ministers of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have a joint stance on matters that concern us," said Minister Szczepietiew. "The French defense minister, who also attended, was even surprised by the fact that we all hold a joint stance. I am especially pleased because this joint stance took shape after my speech. What did we talk

about? We made it clear that we are interested in cooperation that consolidates our security. First of all, this security must take into account the reality connected with the presence of NATO. Second, the West must realize it cannot establish European security without the countries of Central Europe."

"We realize that Western Europe is a little helpless in view of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism and that this helplessness could affect our security. We want to tell every center, force, group, and person on the western side that they should bear this in mind."

In a communiqué adopted at the meeting, the representatives of the "three" agree that European security is chiefly the responsibility of those European and North American countries that allied themselves in NATO to defend the common values of democracy. At the same time, says the communiqué, one should consider the further possibilities to be furnished by the creation of an effective system of security. It is expedient to take part in all joint talks on the subject of security, including West European talks on the formation of European military structures. The French defense minister said one should display an interest in the holding of talks on the subject of new European security structures.

"I think the West appreciates the value of cooperation within the framework of the three. We must bear that in mind," said Minister Szczepietiew. "I said that the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian peoples did not always know how to cooperate with each other in the past. I said that communism has taught us the value of such cooperation. We are drawing conclusions from this. It will have a positive bearing on our national security."

In R. Szczepietiew's view, meetings like this and cooperation between the Visegrad three is a very strong signal to NATO structures to consider our expectations.

#### Compromise on "Small" Constitution Viewed

AL 1401073402 Warsaw NOWA EKOLOGIA in Polish 11 May 92 p 4

[Article by Krzysztof Kotowski: "Chance or a Breakthrough?"]

[Text] Walesa's Sejm speech last Friday was the most spectacular gesture so far in his desire to assume the political initiative. The significance of the small constitution is also increasing. Will both these power centers reach a compromise?

Since Finance Minister Andrzej Ciechowksi's departure, the Sejm has also accepted the resignation of Artur Balazs, the minister responsible for contacts between the political parties. The Sejm vote on this resignation, preceded by a lengthy debate and an explanation by the prime minister, diminished the latter's prestige even further because the number of yes votes was only one

above the required minimum. The Christian-Democratic Party's exit from the ruling coalition is of rather symbolic significance, considering the minimal strength of that group.

Deputy Ryszard Czarniecki (Christian-National Union), told NOWA A EUROPA that the latest events show that the ruling center has been shaken. Politicians in support of the government are even prepared to see a new prime minister as long as power does not go to Wałęsa.

Nevertheless, none of the pro-government coalition's recent efforts to strengthen their position in parliament seem likely to break the deadlock. Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) told NOWA A EUROPA that the KPN does not think its entry to the government would help improve the psychological situation. "Unless such an improvement occurs, the KPN will share the government's fate," he said. "The government's life might be prolonged by another three months, that is all. In such a situation, there is no point in us joining it," concluded Krol. He suggested that Jan Olszewski might step down without a vote of no confidence.

#### **What the President Wants**

Lech Wałęsa has been making it increasingly clear that he wants an alliance with the small coalition, provided it supports his call for greater presidential powers. Yet it is mainly the Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD) deputies who pressured the Sejm extraordinary session to reject the Belwedere's proposed small constitution at the end of last year. In fact, the Democratic Union Deputies Club will shortly present to the Sejm its own plan of a small constitution, with narrower presidential powers. Most Sejm groups have supported the Democratic Union plan.

So if the Sejm agrees to increase the president's powers, will it also agree to all his demands? Will Lech Wałęsa agree to a compromise? It looks as if this issue will be a bone of contention on the political scene for the next few weeks. "In the political dimension, the president has presented one well-known demand, a radical increase in his powers, which is supposed to be a panacea for Poland's problems but is not," said Deputy Jan Maria Rokita (Democratic Union) commenting on Wałęsa's Friday speech. Andrzej Zarebski (KLD) generally agreed with the president's present line. "Whether the next government will merely be a reconstructed government in its present form or a presidential government is not so important. What is important is whether or not the next government emerges as a result of cooperation between parliament and the president."

#### **What Kind of Small Constitution?**

The draft small constitution prepared by the Democratic Union calls for a balance of power between the president, parliament, and government, and gives the president the right to appoint a prime minister. The Sejm commission examining this draft has only met once so

far. Says Minister Lech Falandyński from the Presidential Chancellery: "The president's original draft of the small constitution represents the very maximum of change. The maximum change is represented by his wish for a presidency in the style of De Gaulle. The president is mainly interested in being able to shape the government any way he wants." Nevertheless, Minister Falandyński said there is a good chance for a compromise between the president's wishes and those of the Democratic Union.

Representatives of various Sejm groupings are also declaring their readiness to participate in work on the new document. Says Marek Przybyłowski of the Center Accord: "There are two alternatives, either to adopt our own draft small constitution, and the ruling coalition has no firm ideas about this, or try to modify the Democratic Union's draft. I think the second alternative is more likely." Krzysztof Krol from the KPN does not rule out the possibility of his KPN participation in work on the small constitution, provided that a new election code is passed at the same time. "We do not know which of the two, the small-constitution or a new-election code, will be needed first," he said. "If the Sejm chooses the Democratic Union's draft as the basis, we are to be considered, the Christian-National Union will propose a series of amendments," said Ryszard Czarniecki. "We believe it necessary to look for something in between the French and German types of presidents."

So far the time being, there seems to be a climate of compromise on the subject of the small constitution and the president's plans on how to dispel the current crisis, but no one knows if this climate will last once the debate on concrete solutions starts.

#### **Central Bank Chief Considers Budget Issues**

(L 140598Z MAY 92 RZECZPODITA  
ECONOMY AND LIFE supplement  
in Polish 7 May 92 p. 1)

[Interview with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the Polish National Bank, by Piotr Aleksandrowicz on 9 May, place not given. "The Bank Will Maintain the Value of the Currency"]

[Text] The Sejm approved the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling on public sector employees' pay and rejected most of the Tribunal's ruling on the pension law. Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski has submitted his resignation as he sees no possibility of meeting the budget obligations stemming from the Sejm decision. As inflationary pressure may increase, the stance of the Polish National Bank is of particular importance. RZECZPODITA asked the bank's president, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, to comment on these issues.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The Sejm decision does not affect the realization of monetary policy objectives. The increase in the money supply cannot exceed 1.7 trillion złotys [Z] and that can figure cannot be changed under any circumstances. The way in which the budget is financed will also remain unchanged. The banking

system will finance the budget deficit to an amount not exceeding 250 billion, as we suggested. Then, the Polish National Bank will not need the direct purchase of liquidity funds to over 250 billion.

How we deal with this problem is an internal budget issue. We are not going to go into the question of the structure of the budget, and we are not going to argue whether budget revenues should be increased or expenditure reduced.

But it has to be better so that the bank will not finance a deficit that will exceed the level assumed in the draft budget law. That is our position, because the central bank's task will be to safeguard the value of the currency.

(Ambassador-Walter) We have been asking about what events will take this year. What will happen if the option that a change for implementing the budget will have inflationary consequences for the next few years?

(Ambassador-Walter) The bank will definitely sacrifice the value of the currency. Our goal is to prevent other inflation in a harmonious way that will ensure a stable economic basis.

(Ambassador-Walter) What was your reaction to Minister Andrzej Gertner's suggestion?

(Ambassador-Walter) For me, as president of the central bank, the decision was a bad one, because we cooperated very well with Minister Gertner. I can only say that I regret that it has happened.

(Ambassador-Walter) As IMF comes to visiting Poland, and whether an agreement can be reached with the IMF remains an open question. In your opinion, will what the government under Kiszka an impact on the course of the negotiations?

(Ambassador-Walter) We will do our best to make sure that no changes will affect the cooperation. On the other hand, I assume that what has happened will undermine the confidence that our representatives made, namely, discussions concerning a certain number of institutions, the possibility of longer-term planning, and the political will to maintain a currency that we can describe as efficient enough. Minister Gertner stated this. I did not see written documents, and so did the press attaché. It is unfortunate that this has happened at this time, especially as the first round of talks provided grounds for optimism, and IMF representatives were responding positively to what we put forward in the question of a budget deficit level that will not exceed 5 percent of the gross domestic product. No comments were made about the level of the money supply.

**Bucuresti-Judet Parliamentary Delegation**

An estimated duration: 12-14 days or more.

21 May 93 p. 24

(Text) Bucharest—Romanian President Ion Iliescu last night received a visiting Austrian parliamentary delegation headed by Senator Walter Schäffing.

During the meeting, the delegation conveyed an message from His Majesty King Hassan to the Romanian president, in which his majesty expressed Jordan's firm desire to enhance business cooperation at the union of the interests of the two friendly peoples.

In his part, the Romanian president expressed his country's desire to develop relations between the two countries, and asked the delegation to convey the message to His Majesty the King.

The Romanian president addressed the big possibilities for increasing business contacts at all levels in the service of the two people through joint work and international cooperation.

The Austrian delegation, current visiting Romania at the invitation of the Romanian Parliament, also met with the speaker of the Romanian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The Austrian delegation comprises Mayor of Augsburg, members of the Allianz, and Stephan A. Gschatter, as well as twelve officials from the House of Representatives (General Secretary).

**CD Confirms "Unconstitutional Electoral Bill"**

An estimated duration: 12-14 days or more.

21 May 93 p. 24

**Unconstitutional article "Who Knows of Electoral Law?"**

(Text) The Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention (CD) that met in Bucharest on 1 May noted that the electoral law that is being prepared in the Romanian Parliament is unconstitutional because it violates the principles of the parliamentary election. The bill states that the previous electoral law grants disproportionate weight to the proportional representation, the presence of national minorities during the voting, the lack of the election of the opposition candidates regime is not in the elections, and so on and so forth.

When it reached the stage of being discussed by Deputies' Chamber, the draft became even more unconstitutional through the offer of proposals such as in the amendment that is still being discussed and that attempts to deprive the united opposition of the name the Democratic Convention and the electoral law—the only true popular people's democracy. In the amendment the independent candidates is not in the elections or the law of certain persons or their alliances. At the end of limiting the number of certain national observers present at a polling station to only one person,

as well as other regulations imposed on other citizens. In practice both situations in a quasi-constitutional position by requiring them to be admitted to the parliament to obtain a higher percentage of votes than the 4 percent vote required from parties.

The Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention basically presents with anti-democratic regulation of the electoral law and will be added to the fact that they can have certain consequences both in a domestic and international plane.

**Senate Inauguration in German Press Denied**

An estimated duration: 12-14 days or more.

21 May 93 p. 24

**Senate Inauguration in German Press Denied**

An estimated duration: 12-14 days or more.

21 May 93 p. 24

**Senate Inauguration in German Press Denied**

(Text) It does not surprise us when a Hungarian right-wing movement and former others such as the one called "The League of War," performed by Béla Károlyi at the end of 1992. What surprises us however is the fact that the German newspaper publishes the "Wall in South-East Europe cities confirm again and in one, the same way, the tension between the Hungarians and Romanians of Transylvania has not yet reached its highest stage. But for the first time ethnic violence can be traced within the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (UDMR) formerly known as right-wing of Bucharest does not easily enter up with a legislative right wing for the Hungarian minority. Along with the differences between UDMR factions are continuing."

Speaking the man, Károlyi, writes: "The second article of the UDMR in the past two years was not presented to the government in any way. The new proposal for creating Hungarian high schools and colleges is taken by Bucharest as a need to be. At the same time represents the greatest contradiction in stage following the words uttered in the elections in Transylvania by the Hungarian National Party (PNM), a party that emerged from the cultural organization "Gyula Rákóczi." The last one came to life "The new has a PNM paper. It is an act of courage for young Hungarians to be at the level of right-wing of communist attacks to the power. Before the elections, the Hungarian candidate in Targu Mures was accused from running in the elections on the basis of received accusations. When however the UDMR candidate victory was declared were announced: 'We will wait a year and then we will see until they understand this,' said Bucharest UDMR President member said. This shows that Transylvania is part of the factors around Gyula Székely who is the most radical right-wing opposition. He gives birth to the name of coalition for the Hungarian minority. The author is used Béla Károlyi, writes: "I wish a right wing is not approved now. Then the second edition will be the use of force and a military coup like the one in Yugoslavia. Bucharest chapter-Gyula is the region to which a communist could

to Hungary: "Those who stay behind are the most determined." The increasing pressure by Romanian nationalists has led to reactions among the Hungarian population. Mass exodus and social problems in Hungary and lead to an increasingly hostile attitude toward Romania the consequences of which are unforeseeable. Borbely's fears are also shared by other pressurist members like Mihai Patrascu.

It is surprising that he also comes up with a few other things. "The struggle for power is fierce. Because of pressure against the law on national security, Vice President Sines was replaced as chief of the parliamentary group in the Senate by the majority group around President Gheorghe Dumitrescu, which leaves a compromise." He says a few other true things like the following: "The sensitive nature of the situation is also demonstrated by the attempt last year to proclaim autonomy in the areas that are directly inhabited by Serbs. Thus, a mass meeting was to be convened in accordance with a traditional custom. The Romanian Army moved forces to the area where the said mass meeting was going to be held and ordered the holding of maneuvers on the basis of a civil war scenario. The meeting was postponed." In principle, Borbely supports such projects. "What is at stake is the principle of peoples' self-determination, and the conditions have to be better ones."

Borbely hopes for an autonomous state structure for Transylvania, Banat, and other regions—a "federation based on common culture." In his view, Bessarabia (the former Moldavian Soviet Republic) could play a important role, because it would like to re-unite with Romania only by preserving comprehensive independence. If such an independence was stipulated in the Constitution, it would choose a president that could be followed by other regions on the basis of a certain people's decision. The leadership in Bucharest is aware of this. It could be tempted to prevent such a development in Moldova, this would be possible only "through war in the border areas against the Russians in the Danube region."

The aggressive and clandestine importance of the Russo-Hungarian, Bern-Kalnoky mail exceeds all limits:

If it was accustomed to Romania, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should withdraw its accreditation. Otherwise this regime will continue clandestinely our country in the eyes of the German media.

#### Agrarian Party Discusses Political Platform

AC 7407087902 Bucharest 4303 4812  
to Romanian 7 May 90 p. 1

[Report by Comptroller Lajos: "The Minicongress of the Agrarian Party"]

[Text] A very important meeting of the National Coordinating Council of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (PDAR) concluded yesterday, 6 May. First, the

participants discussed the draft of two basic party documents: the political program and the government program.

According to the PDAR leader, Dr. Victor Sarda, the political program that he presented is a "new stage on the path of the party's management" and a "crystallization of its identity in the political sense." The need for such a doctrine derives from the "support of the electorate." Let us not forget: the Agrarian Party is the only party that increased the number of votes obtained in the last elections four times compared with the 20 May elections, and it has thus become the third national political force.

The drafting of the PDAR, Mr. Sarda claimed, has its origins in Adam Smith's thinking ("the personal needs of the individual is the motor for society's development"). Being a fan of the "capitalist-type of market economy, with strong social protection," the party has made "an unequivocal break with communism ideology."

An essential thesis of the doctrine-type programme is "to ensure the food supply for the entire population," which is something that can be achieved by "internally uniting toward agrocapital."

In his report, the PDAR leader made an extensive analysis of the domestic and international economic-political situation and assessed the options of the Agrarian Party members in the crucial issues confronting the country. Sometimes both Mr. Sarda's report or connection with the political program and the speech delivered by Mr. Ion Săulescu, vice-president of the party, who presented the government program, but mostly the interventions of the participants, seemed to be exclusively agrarian economic discourses. One of the speakers, the president of the Peasant Council branch, trying to explain the situation, made a simple electoral calculation: "If we count bread, we lower the social tax from 10 percent; thus we will have 10 percent of the electorate on our side!"

These were not the only important points of the meeting. The participants also discussed the way in which the PDAR will act in the general and presidential elections. In conclusion, it was agreed that, without certain limits, the opportunism of possible political alliances should be left to the judgment of country branches. The participants also discussed the issue of backing Mr. Victor Sarda as the PDAR's candidate for the office of Romania's president. There were agriculturists in favor ("so that nobody can say any longer that we are an auxiliary party or a branch of the National Salvator Front") but there also were opinions against it. In the end, Mr. Sarda "found an intermediate solution" by deciding not to run for the presidency but to seek instead because his dream is to have the position of deputy prime minister responsible for agriculture. Likewise, the participants suggested that the members and sympathizers of the party should vote for the president of the peasants: "according to their own judgment."

As far as the programming documents are concerned, the National Coordinating Council decided that they should be discussed within the branches and be finalized after a two-week period. In fact, to comply with the PD&R requirements, we will carry excerpts of those documents in tomorrow's issue of our paper.

#### **UDMR's Maneuvers. Possible Alliances Viewed**

4U125050002 Bucharest: A2Z in Romanian  
7 May 92 p. 2

[Article signed I.R. "Concern. Maneuvers by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania"]

[Text] The Attitude of the National Liberal Party towards the Democratic Convention and especially towards the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) has considerably reduced the Hungarian organization's capability and freedom of action. In this election campaign period, the UDMR is thus facing an exceptional situation and, somehow, without any solution since the Hungarian Embassy itself has become involved in the domestic affairs of the Union. This development consists of giving "unofficial dinner parties" to which not necessarily political figures are invited but rather their co-workers. The subject of discussions is the following: What should the UDMR do about such banquets as alliances to obtain the best permanent representation. The concern comes from the fact that in the next legislature the number of parliamentarians representing the Hungarian minority will be, at most, cut in half. The solutions thought of by the Hungarian analysts (one cannot specify the exact percentage of those in the embassy and in the UDMR) are as follows: a) in coalition with the Civic Alliance Party or National Salvation Front (something that does not seem to please Budapest); b) an opposition policy to achieve the desired mandate (and this would employ the strategy of supporting Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy for the country's presidency); c) a "no-and-yes" policy about the claims for autonomy by the UDMR. It seems that the idea of "unofficial dinner parties" will continue.

#### **SRI Director Criticized for Airing Files**

4U1250500042 Bucharest: ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9-10 May 92 p. 1

[Interview with Civic Alliance Party leader Nicolae Manolescu by Tia Serbanescu, place and date not given: "The Most Terrible Thing of All Is That Mr. Magureanu Took Revenge" by Circulating Certain Files]

[Text] [Serbanescu] Mr. Manolescu, if you were to examine the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) and its director, Mr. Virgil Magureanu, which of their mistakes would you consider the most terrible?

[Manolescu] The most terrible thing of all seems to me that the SRI director took revenge by circulating certain files (belonging to the former secret police Securitate). Can you imagine what would happen if all heads of such

important offices as the SRI would act in such a way? It seems to me that—by doing so—Mr. Magureanu has violated the law, so the latter there is more to it than merely the question of his retaliating as editor or not. If evidence is found that it was really Mr. Magureanu who released the files, he will have to face the full severity of the law for his actions. Because it is that a small step between using such files as if they were his own property and forging files.

[Serbanescu] Would you favor making all Securitate files public?

[Manolescu] I would favor taking two different steps at the same time: each person should be allowed sight of his or her file—but no one else's—if he or she is interested. Secondly, a specially appointed commission should warn people holding important offices—such as parliamentarians or ministers—that circulating evidence has stepped up, so they had better resign within a certain time, or else their files would be published.

[Serbanescu] If those persons were journalists, would you have them fired or not?

[Manolescu] I would have them fired only if they had executive positions, otherwise no. After all, people should be allowed to have their showdowns with their own consciences. They should be allowed to decide—because they are able to—whether they confess their culpability or whether they try to hide it and whether such a burden makes it possible for them to judge other people.

#### **Policie Chief Niță Terms U.S. Visit Fraternal**

4U1250500042 Bucharest: TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 7 May 92 pp. 1-2

[Interview with Major General Nicolae Niță, chief of Bucharest Police and deputy chief of the General Police Inspectorate, by Sorin Orăduț Balan, place and date not given: "The Americans Say That We Are Among the Best in the World"]

[Text] [Balan] General, recently you returned from a visit to the United States, together with Mr. Cris Hălăcanu [Bucharest mayor]. Then, should we understand that Bucharest's police are subordinate to the Town Hall?

[Niță] Not at all. Mr. Cris Hălăcanu invited me to be part of the delegation he was heading. The condition for accepting this invitation was that I strictly deal with police affairs. This is the condition on which I went to the United States, where I met with mayors and police chiefs in some American cities, including New York, Washington, Atlanta, and others.

[Balint] What will the visit paid by the police chief to the United States mean for the residents of Bucharest?

[Nica] A very fruitful exchange of opinions took place between me and the American policemen. I have to tell you that we did not go there as poor relations and were not treated like poor relations either. On the contrary, I noted that the Americans knew many things about us and the professional skills of the Romanian policemen, whom they rank among the best in the world, despite the fact that—as you know—we lack equipment. And when I say equipment, I am not referring to the latest equipment, but to what is strictly necessary, because without it we are unable to do our work.

[Balint] By way of equipment, are the Americans helping in this respect?

[Nica] Before answering this question, I want to make a remark—which you probably suspect. The American police, whose rate of apprehending criminals is lower than that of the Romanian police, have the latest equipment at their disposal and there are a great number of policemen: One policeman per 200 citizens. During the meetings I had with mayors and police chiefs, I also raised the problem of the material assistance they may be able to grant and they said they wanted to help us. How this assistance will materialize remains to be seen. Anyhow, we agreed on cooperation in the area of certain violations which are—so to say—"traditional" in their country, but with which we have been confronted only now, after the revolution. I am especially referring to drug trafficking, arms deals, organized crime, and transnational terrorism. We have a lot to learn from them in these areas.

[Balint] You said that you were not treated like some poor relations. But was there any allusion or hint to the fact that Romania's current police was actually Ceausescu's militia wearing different uniforms, but with the same halberds?

[Nica] Not at all. I have told you that they were very well informed about us. They knew that it was our mission—formerly as it is now—to protect people's lives, private and public property, and public peace and order.

[Balint] Briefly put, to catch thieves!

[Nica] Not only. We do have to catch those who commit violations, but we also have to prevent antisocial acts. For example, I remember the episode last year in Maguraia, where, without any complications, and TINERETUL LIBER was present, we were able to defuse an explosive situation that could have degenerated into a bloody conflict, more serious and more harmful than the one at Buhuici [involving clashes with Gypsies].

[Balint] General, in conclusion, a thought for the readers of our paper:

[Nica] I want to tell the readers of your paper and all residents of Bucharest that the police are doing their duty, that the policemen, whether the sections are—24 hours out of 24 hours—at the disposal of the residents of this big city. And I also want to tell them that no matter how dangerous or difficult their task, they will defend peoples' lives, their property, and public peace and quiet even by sacrificing their lives. We want a strong police force, which is ready to intervene whenever a violation is committed. We want a police force that will ensure the peace in the positive sense of the word.

[Balint] Thank you General.

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